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ARTICLES
RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ANTIDUMPING AND ANTITRUST LAWS
Daniel J. Gifford*
The political and economic environment of international trade signif-
icantly differs from the environment of purely domestic trade. In addi-
tion to the risks of political instability, international traders must cope
with fluctuations in the relative values of the currencies in which their
goods are traded and with changing foreign economic regulations. Be-
cause international trade occurs against a backdrop of tariffs and other
trade barriers, the basic rules governing domestic marketplace behavior
apply in a less structured manner. Finally, many national governments
attempt to protect their domestic producers selling in their home mar-
kets or to confer advantages upon them in their export trade.
Within the United States, antitrust law provides a set of ground
rules the stated goal of which is to advance consumer welfare, a goal
that many commentators equate with the furtherance of productive and
allocative efficiency.' While many foreign nations also have antitrust
laws, those laws are generally less oriented towards increasing
efficiency.
* Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I
wish to express my appreciation to Professors Robert Hudec and Robert Kudrie, to
Dean Ronald Cass, to N. David Palmeter and to Michael Fingar who contributed valu-
able suggestions.
1. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984)
and Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (promoting consumer welfare
as an antitrust goal); see also R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 107-15 (1978)
(equating consumer welfare with the furtherance of productive and allocative
efficiencies).
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The United States regulates international trade in part through its
antitrust laws,2 but also through a variety of other laws, most impor-
tantly antidumping and countervailing duty laws.3 Although Congress
aimed those laws at practices it perceived as unfair, those laws are
widely understood as embodying objectives inconsistent with the effi-
ciency goals of the antitrust laws. Moreover, the standards employed to
evaluate marketplace behavior under the trade laws differ significantly
from the standards used to administer the antitrust laws. These con-
flicting sets of laws provide the United States with a schizophrenic ap-
proach to economic policy. Thus, reforming the trade laws to bring
them into conformity with the efficiency policies underlying the anti-
trust laws is highly desirable.
This article addresses unfair and anticompetitive practices which oc-
cur in international trade. It draws heavily from the antitrust laws and
the free-trade policies to which the United States has committed itself
through its adherence to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).4 First, the article reviews the historical concerns underlying
the enactment of antidumping legislation. Second, it addresses the
broad role that scholarship and judicial interpretation have played in
construing legislation governing the analogous problem of domestic
price discrimination. As a result of legal scholarship and judicial deci-
sion-making sensitive to both the historical concerns of the enacting
Congress and the teachings of economics, the courts have radically re-
vised the prevailing construction of section two of the Clayton Antitrust
Act of 19145 (Clayton Act) in its application to domestic price discrim-
ination with "primary-line"' effects. As recently reconstrued, this as-
2. See Monopolies and Combinations in Restraint of Trade, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988)
(addressing conduct involving trade or commerce with foreign nations); see also Anti-
trust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, 4 Trade & Reg. Rep.
(CCH) V 13,109 (1988) (providing guidance for businesses involved with international
operations relating to the Department of Justice's international antitrust policies).
3. See Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1671h (1988)
(addressing the imposition of countervailing duties); see also 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673h
(1988) (imposing antidumping duties); see also 19 U.S.C. §§ 1675-1677k (1988) (con-
taining related provisions).
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
5. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27 (1988)).
6. See Gifford, Primary-Line Injury under the Robinson-Patman Act: The Devel-
opment of Standards and Erosion of Enforcement, 64 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1979)
[hereinafter Gifford, Primary-Line Injury] (explaining that the Robinson-Patman Act
addresses primary-line effects, which are those effects occurring in the market in which
the discriminating seller operates, and secondary-line effects are those occurring in the
market in which the seller's customers operate).
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pect of the Clayton Act is fully consistent with the Sherman Antitrust
Act (Sherman Act).7 The article suggests that a reinterpretation of ex-
isting antidumping legislation could reduce the conflict between that
legislation and the Clayton and Sherman Acts.8 Third, the article dis-
cusses the evolution of the modern understanding of predatory pricing.
Fourth, the article addresses the economic approaches that have been
asserted to be incorporated in antidumping legislation. Finally, the arti-
cle makes proposals for reconstruing antidumping legislation in order
both to respect the congressional concerns underlying that legislation
and to harmonize, so far as possible, antidumping policies with the
competitive market policies underlying the antitrust laws.
I. THE UNITED STATES TRADE AND ANTITRUST LAWS:
THEIR RELATIONSHIPS AND BASIC APPROACHES
Congress enacted the antitrust laws-the Sherman,9 Clayton, 10 and
Federal Trade Commission Acts 11-to further marketplace competition
and to prevent collusive or monopolistic and exclusionary behavior.,2
Monopolistic behavior seeks to restrict the amount of goods and ser-
vices entering the market, and exclusionary behavior attempts to handi-
cap rivals or expel them from the market entirely.
Conversely, Congress designed several trade laws to protect domestic
producers from the competition of foreign rivals.13 First, sales in the
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988)).
10. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914)(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27 (1988)).
11. Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1988)). Although the Federal Trade Commission Act does not fall
within the Clayton Act's definition of "antitrust laws," the Supreme Court arguably
regards it as an antitrust law because it condemns the same behavior as the other
antitrust laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 12a (1988); Fashion Originators' Guild of America,
Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463 (1941) (stating that the Federal Trade Commission has
the power to suppress a combination which runs counter to the policies of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts).
12. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988) (stating that any restraint of trade or attempt to
monopolize by groups or individuals is illegal under the Sherman Act); 15 U.S.C. §
45(a)(2) (1988) (empowering the Federal Trade Commission specifically to prevent
unfair competition); 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988) (declaring price discrimination illegal).
13. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 337, 46 Stat. 703 (1930) (current version at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337 (1988) (stating that unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the im-
portation of articles into the United States, or in their sale are unlawful); Trade Act of
1974, ch. 301, 88 Stat. § 2411 (1974) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411
(1988)) (protecting United States exporters against discriminatory and unreasonable
practices); id. § 201 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1988) (providing an
escape clause); see also 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1671h (1988) (providing countervailing
duties); id. §§ 1673-1677h (1988) (creating antidumping duties).
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United States at prices below the foreign producers' home-market
prices constitute international price discrimination, which is generally
referred to as "dumping." ' Antidumping laws impose duties on foreign
producers who sell their goods in the United States at below-cost prices
or at a lower price than in their home markets whenever those low
priced sales in the American market threaten to produce a material
injury to an American industry. Second, countervailing duty laws dis-
courage foreign government subsidies by authorizing offsetting duties
whenever foreign subsidies produce a similar impact upon an American
industry."5 Both antidumping and countervailing duty laws appear to
conflict with the competitive market objectives of the antitrust laws.'0
Despite superficial inconsistencies, however, it appears possible to
reconcile trade and antitrust laws to a substantial extent. Regulators
may be able to bring these laws into greater harmony by construing
trade laws according to their underlying purpose to protect domestic
firms from unfair behavior.17 This approach to reconciling the trade
and antitrust laws is not new. Barbara Epstein formulated an early ver-
sion of this argument in 1973.18 I will argue below that the legislative
14. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673h (1988) (providing the rule regarding the imposi-
tion of antidumping duties and expanding on their administration).
15. See id. § 1671a-1671h (1988) (creating general rules regarding countervailing
duties and expanding on their administration).
16. See id. § 1337 (1988) (stating that goods which, if sold within the United
States, would involve sales violating United States intellectual property laws, are ex-
cludable at the border). These laws are not anticompetitive in substance, but, by af-
fording greater protection against foreign infringement than against domestic infringe-
ment, these laws create impediments to the pursuit of free-trade objectives because
they conflict with the obligations of the United States under the GATT to afford na-
tional treatment to foreign sellers. See GATT Council Decision, 6 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1466 (Nov. 15, 1989). GATT is the primary international legal mechanism
designed to further the objectives of free trade.
17. See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text (outlining the goals of the rele-
vant laws).
18. Epstein, The Illusory Conflict between Antidumping and Antitrust, 18 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 1 (1973) (stating that antidumping regulation serves as an extension of
antitrust laws). A somewhat different approach towards construing the trade laws in a
more competitive direction is contained in Wood, "Unfair" Trade Injury: A Competi-
tion-Based Approach, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1153 (1989). Although the relation between
the trade and antitrust laws is a source of continuing comment in the literature, most
commentators conclude that the two sets of laws are in irreconcilable conflict. See, e.g.,
Applebaum, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An Antitrust Per-
spective, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 409 (1987); Victor, Antidumping and Antitrust: Can the
Inconsistencies be Resolved?, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT.'L L. & POL. 339, 348-50 (1983) (stat-
ing that the Antidumping Act of 1921 and its successor statute, Title VII of the Tariff
Act of 1930, have historically been administered without the antitrust objectives of
encouraging price competition); Comment, The Antidumping Act-Tariff or Antitrust
Law?, 74 YALE L.J. 707, 713-15 (1965) [hereinafter Comment, The Antidumping
Act]. But see Eckes, The Interface of Antitrust and Trade Laws-Conflict or Har-
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history of the trade laws supports this position and that modern theo-
ries of interpretation provide further support.
This argument, in broad outline, is as follows: The trade laws are
designed to protect domestic firms from unfair behavior. Unfairness, in
business, as in other contexts, is an evolving concept. The criteria for
business unfairness as a legal cause of action in the United States have
generally reflected competitive market norms. Both unfair competition
law and the federal and state antitrust laws generally reflect this goal.
Broad reexamination of the conceptions of unfairness embodied in the
trade laws may reveal either a latent consistency with the competitive
market norms underlying the antitrust and unfair competition laws, or
at least potential for reconciliation.
II. PRICE DISCRIMINATION AS THE SUBJECT OF THE
CLAYTON AND ANTIDUMPING ACTS
A. PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: DUMPING
Although an historic rationale for customs duties was the discourage-
ment of foreign "dumping", specific legislation directed against that
practice dates back, at the earliest, to the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894
(1894 Act). 9 Although the 1894 Act apparently applies to some be-
havior involving price discrimination in international trade,20 it does not
specifically refer to price discrimination or dumping. The Antidumping
Act of 1916 (1916 Act) contains the first unambiguous statutory prohi-
bition directed against dumping.21 The 1916 Act defines dumping as
the sale of goods in the United States at prices lower than those pre-
vailing in the seller's home market.22
mony? An ITC Commissioner's Perspective, 56 ANTITRUsT L.J. 417 (1987) (stating a
belief in the compatibility of the long-run objectives of the antitrust and trade laws).
19. Wilson Tariff Act of 1894, 28 Stat. 570 (1894) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 8-11 (1988)).
20. See Western Concrete Structures Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 760 F.2d 1013, 1018-19
(9th Cir.) cert. denied 474 U.S. 903 (1985)(supporting the proposition that conspira-
cies among two or more defendants to sell in the United States at prices lower than
those charged by the defendants in their home markets would apparently fall under the
Wilson Tariff Act); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F.
Supp. 1100, 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1981), revd on other grounds, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.
1983), rev'd, 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (holding similarly that a conspiracy by defendants to
sell in the United States at low prices while selling at high prices in their foreign home
market would violate the Wilson Tariff Act). The plaintiffs in the latter case were
unsuccessful because they did not possess evidence of such a conspiracy. Matsushita
Elec. Indus., Co. 475 U.S. at 595-96.
21. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 801, 39 Stat. 798 (1916) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1988) [hereinafter 1916 Act].
22. Id.
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Congress wrote the 1894 and the 1916 Acts as antitrust laws. Both
statutes are framed in classic antitrust language. The 1894 Act forbids
every "combination, conspiracy, trust, agreement, or contract . . . in-
tended to operate in restraint of lawful trade. 23 The 1916 Act pros-
cribes sales of goods in the United States at levels below the home-
market price when the seller acts with the intent "of destroying or in-
juring an industry in the United States, or of preventing the establish-
ment of an industry in the United States, or of restraining or mono-
polizing any part of the trade and commerce in such articles in the
United States .... -24 This intent to destroy or injure an industry or to
prevent its establishment is, in today's language, a "predatory" intent.25
Concern about predatory behavior was widespread during the second
decade of this century. That concern underlay the enactment, two years
before the 1916 Act, of the provisions directed against domestic price
discrimination in the Clayton Act.26
Unlike the 1916 Act, antidumping legislation enacted in 1921 does
not require proof of predatory intent. 27 As a result, the 1921 Act pro-
vides a means for domestic industry to protect itself against competi-
tion that is nonpredatory and fair. Congress reenacted most of the sub-
stantive provisions of the 1921 Act in the Trade Agreements Act of
1979,28 an act which tightens the decisional timetable for making an-
tidumping determinations and elaborates the procedures required for
such a determination. 2 The provisions of the 1979 Act can and should
be reconstrued consistently with the objectives of the antitrust laws.30
23. 28 Stat. 570 (1894), 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1988).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1988). The 1916 Act is widely understood as an antitrust law.
See, e.g., Fourth Ann. Jud. Conf. U.S. Ct. App. Fed. Cir., 112 F.R.D. 439, 541, 544-
45 (1986) (setting forth Charlene Barshefsky's remarks describing the 1916 Act as an
antitrust law); see also Comment, The Antidumping Act, supra note 18, at 714 (ad-
dressing the similarities between the language of the 1916 Act and the Clayton Act).
25. See C. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIcs 276 (3d ed. 1963) (defin-
ing predatory dumping as gaining access to a market by selling at a loss).
26. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27 (1988).
27. Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14 § 201, 42 Stat. 11 (1921), repealed by Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 162 (1979) (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1671 (1988) [hereinafter 1921 Act].
28. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 93 Stat. 162 (1979) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §
1673 (1988)).
29. Id.
30. See Parts V and VI of this article, infra (proposing and justifying such a
reconciliation).
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B. THE MULTIPLE TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
TRADE LAWS
The trade laws of the immediate post World War I period imposed
tariffs to protect developing sectors of American industry from foreign
competition, provide inexpensive supplies to industry, and raise reve-
nue.31 Congress eventually added the rationale of protecting American
workers from low-wage foreign competition. 32 Gradually, the revenue-
generating impact of the tariff laws declined in importance as the in-
come tax increased in importance. In the 1930s, the United States gov-
ernment began pursuing a policy designed to lower trade barriers. The
policy began with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act,"3 under
which the United States granted tariff concessions to nations that made
similar concessions to the United States.34 The United States took a
major step towards further trade liberalization when it entered the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 35
III. PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN DOMESTIC TRADE
A. SECTION Two OF THE CLAYTON ACT AND THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN AMENDMENTS
Congress first enacted laws governing domestic price discrimination
in the Clayton Act.38 In 1936, the Robinson-Patman Act 37 (or Robin-
son-Patman amendments) expanded the Clayton Act. After a check-
ered history of interpretation, antitrust scholars and practitioners have
reached a widespread consensus on the impact of domestic price dis-
crimination on marketplace competition and on the application of the
Robinson-Patman Act.3" The existing consensus on domestic price dis-
31. See, e.g., Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 858, 922 (current version at 19 U.S.C. §
1202 (1988) (presenting the imported articles for which duties must be paid). The
"free list" ensured that domestic industry was provided inexpensive supplies. Id.; see
also id. preamble (acknowledging that a purpose of the Tariff Act of 1922 was raising
revenue).
32. Tariff Act of 1930, preamble, 46 Stat. 590 (current version at 19 U.S.C. §
1337 (1988)).
33. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, 48 Stat. 943 (1934)(codified as amended at
19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-54 (1988)).
34. Id.
35. GATT, supra note 4.
36. Clayton Antitrust Act, 38 Stat. 730, ch. 323, § 2 (1914) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988)) (prohibiting some kinds of price discrimination).
37. Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, §§ 1-4, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1988)).
38. As amended, the price discrimination provisions of the Clayton Act are gener-
ally referred to as the Robinson-Patman Act. Id.
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crimination can assist the development of a needed reevaluation of the
treatment of price discrimination in international trade.
The original version of section two of the Clayton Act focused upon
predatory pricing." Both the House 40 and Senate reports4I describe the
alleged practices of the Standard Oil Company,42 which sold in one
community at uneconomically low prices until it drove out its rivals and
gained a monopoly. 43 After acquiring its local monopoly, Standard Oil
raised prices to supracompetitive levels. 44 According to the House re-
port, monopoly revenues generated in other markets subsidized Stan-
dard Oil's low prices. 41 Although the authors of these reports may have
misunderstood Standard Oil's behavior,46 the committee reports reveal
the congressional assumptions underlying the legislation and therefore
the intent of the legislation. 47 Thus, as understood by Congress, price
discrimination was an essential component of predatory pricing.
In 1936, Congress, by enacting the Robinson-Patman Amendments,
sought to protect small grocery and drug stores from the perceived mis-
use by chain stores of their greater buying power.48 Congress believed
that chain stores employed their ability to purchase in large quantities
to bargain down prices from their suppliers.49 This allowed the chain
stores to sell merchandise at a lower price than their smaller rivals who
lacked such bargaining power.50 Consequently, Congress maintained,
chains and other large buyers acquired competitive advantages which
39. See, e.g., P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 720 (1978).
40. H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 8 (1914).
41. S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Scss. 2-4 (1914).
42. H.R. REP. No. 627, supra note 40, at 8.
43. id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, I J.L. &
ECON. 137 (1958) (questioning whether the Standard Oil Company actually engaged
in predatory price discrimination to achieve or maintain its monopoly). McGee con-
tends that little or no evidence exists to support the predatory pricing claim. Id. at 138.
47. See H.R. REP. No. 627, supra note 40, at 8-9 (finding that firms like Standard
Oil and American Tobacco sold their products at low prices to drive out rivals and
recoup their losses by charging higher prices in markets where they maintained a
monopoly).
48. See generally Gifford, Assessing Secondary-Line Injury Under the Robinson-
Patman Act: The Concept of "Competitive Advantage", 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 48,
50-52 (1976) [hereinafter Gifford, Secondary-Line Injury] (discussing the concept of
competitive advantage). See also F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBIN-
SON PATMAN ACT 8-13 (1962).
49. See Gifford, Secondary-Line Injury, supra note 48, at 50-51 (noting that Con-
gress perceived a threat to the continued existence of smaller businesses by chain busi-
nesses unfairly using their purchasing power over their smaller rivals).
50. id.
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were not based upon their superior efficiencies. 5 Congress sought to
remedy this problem by targeting suppliers.52 The Robinson-Patman
amendments thus added a new conditionally phrased prohibition
against price discrimination designed to protect business customers. 3
The original Clayton Act and the Robinson-Patman amendments
thus were directed towards different problems. The Clayton Act origi-
nally focused on price discrimination likely to produce injury to compe-
tition at the same level of the market in which the discriminating seller
operates. This type of injury is known as "primary-line" injury." The
Robinson-Patman amendments, by contrast, focus upon competition at
the customer level by considering the extent to which a seller's price
discrimination among its customers adversely affects competition
among buyers. This type of injury is referred to as "secondary-line"
injury.55 The Robinson-Patman amendments generated a plethora of
activity by the Federal Trade Commission and stimulated private liti-
gation. Moreover, the amendments temporarily instilled new life into
the prohibitions against discrimination producing primary-line effects.56
B. THE EVOLUTION IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF PRICE
DISCRIMINATION PRODUCING PRIMARY-LINE EFFECTS
True to the legislative history of section two of the Clayton Act,
early primary-line cases generally involved predatory intent. 1 After the
revision of section two in the Robinson-Patman amendments, the courts
and the Federal Trade Commission appeared to accept a construction
of section two which no longer required predatory intent."8 The Second
Circuit took the lead in applying section two to forbid discriminatory
pricing that results in a diversion of business to the price-cutter.59 In
the Second Circuit, a plaintiff did not need to show predatory intent or
51. Id.
52. Id. at 52.
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988) (revising section two of the Clayton Act by
prohibiting price discrimination).
54. See generally Gifford, Primary-Line Injury. supra note 6, (giving an in-depth
analysis of the problem of primary-line discrimination and the role of the Federal
Trade Commission in enforcing the Act and in formulating evaluative criteria).
55. See Gifford, Secondary-Line Injury, supra note 48, at 52 (defining the competi-
tive harm at the buyer level which the Robinson-Patman Act sought to forbid).
56. Gifford, Primary-Line Injury, supra note 6, at I.
57. See, e.g., Puerto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30
F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 1929).
58. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967) (suggesting
that a finding of predatory discrimination is unnecessary).
59. E.g., Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
326 U.S. 734 (1945).
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predatory behavior.80 This approach converted section two into a stat-
ute imposing a stifling price rigidity upon all sellers. This price rigidity
was the antithesis of competitive-market behavior.6 So long as courts
continued to construe section two in this manner, that section directly
conflicted with the rest of the antitrust laws. 2
The zenith of this approach came in 1967 when the Supreme Court
decided Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.6 3 In this case, the
Court disclaimed any requirement that the plaintiff prove predatory in-
tent as part of a primary-line case under section two. 4 The plaintiff,
Utah Pie Company, while maintaining a 66.5 % share of the frozen pie
market in Salt Lake City, came under severe price competition from
three national companies.66 Because the national companies sold in
markets other than Salt Lake City and the Utah Pie Company did not,
only the national companies sold the same product simultaneously at
different prices. Consequently, only the national companies engaged in
price discrimination. 6 The formal issue was whether the price discrimi-
nation may have lessened competition or tended to create a monopoly
within the meaning of section two.6 7 The price competition in Salt Lake
City resulted in the Utah Pie Company's market share falling to
45.3 % although it constantly increased its sales and continued to earn
profits.68 As the Utah Pie Company's share decreased, market concen-
tration decreased as well. According to the standards espoused in anti-
trust merger cases, the Salt Lake City frozen pie market became more
competitive as a result of the intense price competition.6 9
Despite this apparent procompetitive effect on the Salt Lake City
market, the Supreme Court reversed a court of appeals decision for the
defendants and asserted that the finder of fact might rationally find
that price discrimination may lessen competition within the meaning of
section two when it produces a "drastically declining price structure. '70
In so ruling, the Court imposed a paradoxical meaning on section two's
reference to injuring competition. The Court condemned the defend-
ants' price reductions, none of which fell below their marginal costs.
60. Id.
61. See Gifford, Primary-Line Injury, supra note 6, at 14.
62. See supra notes 1, 9-12 and accompanying text (describing provisions of the
antitrust laws promoting competition).
63. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
64. Id. at 702-04.
65. Id. at 689-94.
66. Id. at 690-91.
67. Id. at 690-704.
68. Id. at 689-702.
69. Id. at 704-05 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 703.
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The conduct proscribed by the Court thus resembled, if not matched,
the behavior encouraged by the Sherman Act: price cutting by firms
striving to attract customers away from rivals.71 Aside from referring
to the declining price structure, the court failed to explain how the be-
havior of all of the parties differed from the price rivalry fostered by
the Sherman Act.72 In the immediate wake of the Utah Pie decision,
most lawyers would probably have advised their multi-market clients to
avoid intense price competition in local markets, which would necessa-
rily involve geographic price differentials and thus the possible applica-
tion of the Robinson-Patman Act.
The Utah Pie decision, though misguided, produced few disastrous
effects. While conveying a broad antipathy towards price discrimina-
tion, the majority opinion provided little guidance to courts seeking to
differentiate lawful from unlawful price discrimination. As a result,
lower courts frequently distinguished Utah Pie and rejected claims of
illegal discrimination. 3
Legal scholars ultimately undermined the Utah Pie decision. Ward
Bowman launched the offensive with a scathing attack in the Yale Law
Journal shortly after the decision was released. 4 The actual demise of
Utah Pie as an effective legal precedent began with the publication, in
the Harvard Law Review, of the seminal article, Predator), Pricing
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act7 5 by Professors Philip Areeda and
Donald Turner. As the title indicates, the article primarily addressed
predatory pricing claims under the Sherman Act. The authors argued,
however, that the analysis they developed for dealing with predatory
pricing claims under the Sherman Act should apply to primary-line
claims under the Robinson-Patman Act as well.76 They reasoned that
71. Id. at 702-04.
72. Id. at 703.
73. See Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 179 n.12 (5th Cir. 1967) (noting that
competitors experienced an increase in absolute sales volume, proportionately improv-
ing their market position, and that in the past, courts received such evidence as dispel-
ling the existence of injury); see also Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 385 F.2d 696, 702, 711
(7th Cir. 1968) (interpreting the intentions of the Robinson-Patman Act as not dis-
couraging new competitors from entering markets). The court's position did not recon-
cile with the Federal Trade Commission's concern, expressed in the case, about the
concentration of market power. Id. at 702.
74. See Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case,
77 YALE L.J. 70 (1967) (attacking Utah Pie as being anticompetitive and apparently
disregarding the promotion of a competitive market).
75. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88
HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975); III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANnTRUST LAW 150-94
(1978) [hereinafter P. AREEDA & D. TURNER].
76. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 75, at 726-28 (arguing that the substantive
issues raised by the Robinson-Patman Act should be interpreted no differently in pri-
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Congress' concern with discrimination cases having primary-line effects
manifested itself in the original 1914 Clayton Act, because its legisla-
tive history identifies unlawful discrimination with predatory pricing.77
Congress designed the 1936 Robinson-Patman amendments to expand
the language of the Clayton Act to cover price discrimination with sec-
ondary-line effects but not to modify the Clayton Act's approach to-
wards primary-line cases.7 8
Under the Areeda and Turner formulation, marginal cost plays a de-
cisive theoretical role.79 Areeda and Turner argue that because no busi-
ness firm could maximize its profits or minimize its losses by pricing
below marginal cost, such pricing indicates a long-run goal: the acquisi-
tion of future market power by driving rivals out of the market.8 Ac-
cordingly, courts should presume pricing below marginal cost is preda-
tory and hence unlawful."' Conversely, Areeda and Turner propose that
courts should presume pricing at or above marginal cost is lawful,
largely because marginal cost pricing maximizes short-run welfare and
because tests based upon long-run welfare are difficult to administer.82
Although they consider marginal cost as the theoretical dividing line
between lawful and unlawful pricing, Areeda and Turner suggest that
courts use average variable cost as a surrogate for marginal cost be-
cause of the ease of calculating average variable cost.8 3
Scholars extensively debated the Areeda and Turner average varia-
ble cost test for evaluating predatory pricing claims.8 4 Although the
critics identify a number of theoretical and practical problems with
mary-line cases unless the statutory language or the legislative history dictates
otherwise).
77. See id. at 727 (stating that the substantive issues raised by the Robinson-Pat-
man Act's concern with primary-line injury in comparison to the Sherman Act's con-
cern with predatory pricing are identical).
78. See id. (interpreting the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act).
79. Id. at 709-16.
80. See id. at 711 (arguing that setting prices above marginal costs would not pro-
mote the natural course of free competition by permitting the survival of less efficient
firms).
81. Id. at 711-12.
82. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 75, at 164-68; Areeda & Turner, supra
note 75, at 711-12 (stating that forcing a firm to charge higher prices reduces industry
output and wastes resources in the long run).
83. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 75, at 716-18 (stipulating that an average
variable cost rule should allow a defendant to demonstrate that its price was equal to or
above a "reasonably anticipated average variable cost").
84. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 868 (1976); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis,
87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977); Areeda & Turner, Williamson on Predatory Pricing, 87
YALE L.J. 1337 (1978); Brodley & Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic The-
ories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1981).
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that test,85 its comparative simplicity and easy applicability, together
with its readily understandable rationale, have helped it to prevail in
the courts. Since 1975, almost all of the federal circuit courts have
adopted a version of the Areeda and Turner test." Although the Su-
preme Court has never itself overruled Utah Pie, the case law in the
federal circuits, by incorporating the Areeda and Turner test, has effec-
tively rejected that case as a precedent in primary-line price discrimi-
nation cases.
The present Supreme Court approves of these post-Utah Pie develop-
ments. In Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. the
Court rejected claims of a predatory price conspiracy under the Sher-
man Act because of the economic implausibility of the claims.8 8 Al-
though it declined to endorse a particular cost-based standard, the Su-
preme Court indicated its awareness of contemporary predatory pricing
analysis by extensive citation to Robert Bork's The Antitrust Para-
dox. 9 Since Bork vigorously criticized Utah Pie in that book, 0 the
Matsushita decision suggests a complete turnaround by the Court.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has also indicated that lower courts
should construe the Robinson-Patman Act in conformity with the pro-
85. Williamson, Williamson on Predatory Pricing II, 88 YALE L.J. 1183 (1979);
Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory
Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979); Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing
Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979).
86. Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning Ferris Indus., 845 F.2d 404. 407 (2d Cir.
1988), affid, 492 U.S. 257 (1989); C.E. Services, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 759 F.2d
1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1037 (1985); Arthur S.
Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1060 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615
F.2d 427, 431 (7th Cir. 1980); Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet
Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 598 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied. 484 U.S. 1010 (1988);
Marsann Co. v. Brammall, Inc., 788 F.2d 611, 616 (9th Cir. 1986); Instructional Sys-
tems Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639, 649 (10th Cir. 1987). In
addition, two other circuits have expressed sympathy for the Areeda-Turner approach.
Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 233-35 (1st Cir. 1983); 0.
Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 352 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1017 (1982). The Eleventh Circuit, however, has rejected the Areeda-Turncr proposal.
McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1496 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989). The Seventh Circuit has recently disavowed the Areeda-
Turner test for the Robinson-Patman Act as inconsistent with the Utah Pie decision.
See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1404-06 (7th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990).
87. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
88. Id. at 598.
89. Id. at 589. Subsequently, the Court again showed its understanding and accept-
ance of current predatory pricing analysis. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc.; 479
U.S. 104, 119-22 & nn.15-17 (1986).
90. R. BORK, supra note 1, at 386-87.
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competitive policies of the Sherman Act.91 The Supreme Court will
probably endorse the lower courts' decisions to use similar predatory
pricing standards under both the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts.
In summary, the prevailing interpretation of the Robinson-Patman
amendments' application to primary-line price discrimination claims
has undergone extensive development. The prevalent construction har-
monizes the amendments with the Sherman Act. Today, the same tests
apply to pricing challenged under the Robinson-Patman Act or the
Sherman Act. The legislative history of the original Clayton Act pro-
vides strong support for this current interpretation of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act.92
C. THE EVOLUTION OF UNLAWFUL PRICING WITH PRIMARY-LINE
EFFECTS UNDER THE CLAYTON ACT
The history of pricing under the Clayton Act reveals two interrelated
lines of development. First, the prevailing understanding of the prohibi-
tion contained in section two has undergone immense change since the
Clayton Act was first enacted in 1914. Initially, the Clayton Act was
understood as addressing predatory pricing. After the enactment of the
Robinson-Patman amendments,93 the Federal Trade Commission and
the courts began to use the Clayton Act against business firms when
their pricing adversely affected their rivals, even when that pricing was
patently nonpredatory. 4 Today, the courts have virtually returned to
their original position before the Robinson-Patman amendments and
apply the Clayton Act only against predatory price discriminationY
Second, an increased understanding of predatory pricing has shaped
the current construction of the Clayton Act. Predatory pricing has al-
ways been understood as pricing at levels which were lower than opti-
mal for short-run profit maximization purposes in order to force rivals
from the market or otherwise to injure them. In the last two decades,
however, large segments of the legal profession have come to appreciate
the precise characteristics of predatory pricing and the contexts in
which it occurs. Largely due to Professors Areeda and Turner, scholars
widely recognize and accept the full scenario of predatory pricing and
the limited set of conditions in which predatory pricing is plausible. A
predator surrenders short-run profits otherwise available as a means for
91. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 458-59 (1978); Au-
tomatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953).
92. H.R. REP. No. 627, supra note 40, at 8.
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a (1936).
94. See Gifford, Primary-Line Injury, supra note 6, at 12-17.
95. See supra note 86 (citing illustrative cases).
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seeking a long-run goal. That goal is the facilitation of monopoly or
monopoly-like pricing in the future.
Predatory pricing must, therefore, achieve its goal either by driving
rivals out of the market or by disciplining rivals sufficiently so that they
will cooperate in monopoly-like pricing. A potential predator must pos-
sess sufficient market power to reduce market prices to predatory levels.
The practical requirement that a predator initially possess the requisite
amount of excess capacity to absorb rivals' market shares limits the
cases in which a predator can seek to displace rather than merely disci-
pline its rivals. This requirement alone eliminates many otherwise plau-
sible predatory pricing claims. Moreover, all predatory pricing scena-
rios presuppose that the predator will recoup the sacrifices of present
revenues with interest from the future monopoly gains. Entry barriers
must exist to prevent new rivals from encroaching on the predator's
market and foiling its ability to recoup its earlier losses through high
monopoly prices.
As the courts' awareness of the elements of predatory pricing has
risen, so has their skepticism of predatory pricing claims. Firms can
practice predatory pricing only in limited situations. First, the predator
must be sufficiently large to acquire market power. Second, the market
itself must be protected by entry barriers. In cases in which a predator
seeks to displace its rivals, it must possess the necessary amount of ini-
tially unused capacity to absorb the competitors' market shares. Preda-
tory behavior cannot occur if these conditions are not fulfilled.
IV. A NEEDED REINTERPRETATION OF THE
ANTIDUMPING ACTS
A. THE PREDATORY PRICING BACKGROUND OF THE ANTIDUMPING
AcTs
Although scholars have understood the concept of predatory pricing
throughout the twentieth century, only toward the end of the century
have they widely agreed upon precise conditions for its use. The legisla-
tive history of section two of the 1914 Clayton Act describes the prac-
tices of the old Standard Oil Company and American Tobacco Com-
pany of lowering "the prices of their commodities, oftentimes below the
cost of production in certain communities and sections . . . with the
intent to destroy and make unprofitable the business of their competi-
tors."96 The House report depicts the low prices as "below cost or with-
96. H.R. REP. No. 627, supra note 40, at 8.
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out a fair profit."'97 Congress thought that Standard and American
used such behavior to drive out rivals and gain local monopolies for
themselves.9 8
The authors of the House report did not possess a precise concept of
predatory pricing that could withstand critical attack by a modern
economist. They did, however, have a broad understanding of the be-
havior that they sought to eliminate: pricing at levels that are below
cost or that do not generate a fair profit. Moreover, the House report
perceives predatory pricing as closely connected with price discrimina-
tion. 99 A business firm that sells at unreasonably low prices in some
locations, in the view of the House authors, "must necessarily recoup
its losses ...by raising the price of this same class of commodities
above their fair market value in other sections or communities." 100
Although this legislative history suggests that Congress wanted to
outlaw predatory pricing and provides some indication of Congress' un-
derstanding of predatory pricing, section two of the Clayton Act does
not contain an explicit intent requirement. The Act forbids price dis-
crimination whenever discrimination "may" result in a lessening of
competition or a tendency towards monopoly. 10 1 The identification of
predatory pricing by the House committee as the focus of the legisla-
tion suggests that the Act's drafters largely equated the reduced com-
petition referred to in the Act with predatory pricing. The Act reflects
Congress' decision to define the forbidden conduct objectively rather
than through a subjective intent requirement. 102
When Congress enacted the 1916 Act, which proscribed dumping
when the seller intends to destroy, injure, or prevent the establishment
of a domestic industry, it was probably operating with a sense of preda-
toriness no better defined than that underlying section two of the Clay-
ton Act, enacted two years earlier.' 0 3 Congress probably found that the
double set of prices-the high home-market price and the low United
States price-raised an inference of unfairness, just as Congress be-
lieved that domestic price discrimination raised an inference of preda-
97. Id. at 9.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1-2.
102. Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, § 2 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1988)).
103. That Congress intended the 1916 Act to be an analogue to Clayton Act § 2 is
further indicated by the inclusion in the 1916 Act of an analogue to Clayton Act § 3,
39 Stat. 799 (1916) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 73 (1988)).
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tory pricing.'" The cross-market subsidization analysis, which ap-
peared in the legislative history of the Clayton Act two years earlier,
was probably accepted by the Congress which enacted the 1916 Act.
Congress directed the 1916 Act explicitly at predatory pricing.10 5
The 1916 Act creates criminal penalties for violators and permits civil
actions by private plaintiffs, who may collect treble damages.100 Viola-
tion of the 1916 Act requires an "intent" of "destroying or injuring" an
industry in the United States or of preventing its establishment."0 Al-
though Congress directed both the 1916 Act and the Clayton Act at
predatory pricing carried out in a context of price discrimination, the
mechanics of the two acts differ. The 1916 Act imposes an intent re-
quirement 08 whereas the Clayton Act lacks an explicit intent require-
ment but does require a showing of a likely impact upon the market. 0 9
This difference should not be surprising if Congress believed that pred-
atory pricing could be established as well by showing intent as by
showing probable market impact. There is, thus, reason to believe that
Congress directed the 1916 Act against behavior analogous to that pro-
scribed in section two of the Clayton Act.
Next, and more problematic, is the relation between the 1916 Act
and the 1921 Act. Rather than repealing the earlier legislation, the
1921 Act merely adds its own parallel antidumping machinery." 0 The
1921 Act omits the cumbersome judicial enforcement machinery of the
1916 Act and substitutes administrative enforcement mechanisms. It
also drops the intent requirements of the 1916 Act, probably because
proving such an intent was too difficult in practice.1 2 Yet the 1921 Act
replaces the intent-to-injure requirement with an actual injury require-
ment. The statutory description of actual injury under the 1921 Act
largely tracks the intent-to-injure requirement under the 1916 Act.
Thus, the 1921 Act requires the secretary of the Treasury, prior to
imposing antidumping duties, to find that "an industry in the United
104. See Fourth Ann. Jud. Conf. U.S. Ct. App. Fed Cir., 112 F.R.D. 439, 544
(where Ms. Barshefsky draws the same conclusion as does this author).
105. Id.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1988).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
13 (1988).
110. Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, § 201, 42 Stat. 11.
111. Id.
112. H.R. REP. No. 479, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1919); see also J. VINER, DuMP-
ING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 244-45 (1923). Victor, supra note 18, at
346; Caine, A Case for Repealing the Antidumping Provisions of The Tariff Act of
1930, 13 L. & POL'Y IN INT. Bus. 681, 715 (1981).
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States is being or is likely to be injured, or is prevented from being
established .... "I Under the 1921 Act, the Secretary had to find that
a foreign company injured, threatened to injure, or prevented the estab-
lishment of an American industry. The 1916 Act required the plaintiff
to prove that the defendant intended to destroy or injure or prevent the
establishment of an American industry." 4 The 1921 Act substituted an
administrative finding of actual or threatened result for a judicial de-
termination of intent to achieve results.""
The related phraseology of the 1921 and 1916 Acts suggests that,
although enforcement methods and elements of proof differ under the
two Acts, Congress nonetheless directed both against the same or simi-
lar phenomenon. There is ground for believing that this phenomenon
was predatory pricing." 6 Some elements of the legislative history of the
1921 Act corroborate this view. The House report treats the proposed
legislation as complementing the Sherman Act:
Over 20 years ago, by the enactment of the Sherman antitrust
law, Congress recognized the necessity of legislation to prevent
unfair methods of competition and monopoly within the United
States, but effective legislation to prevent discriminations and un-
fair practices from abroad, to destroy competition and control
prices, has not been enacted."'
The legislation then pending would, in the view of the House commit-
tee, serve that purpose. Indeed, the committee's view of the pending
antidumping legislation as a form of antitrust law draws support from
a number of events familiar to the Congress of 1921 which linked price
discrimination, monopoly behavior, and the antitrust laws. Geographic
price discrimination had been part of a monopolization case that Stan-
dard Oil Company lost in the Supreme Court in 1911."1 Congress had
targeted geographic price discrimination by enacting section two of the
113. Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, § 201, 42 Stat. 11.
114. Antidumping Act of 1916, § 800, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 72
(1988)).
115. Id.
116. Ehrenhaft, Protection against International Price Discrimination: United
States Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 44, 47 (1958);
Comment, supra note 18, at 713-15. UNITED STATES TARIFF COMM'N, INFORMATION
CONCERNING DUMPING AND UNFAIR FOREIGN COMPETITION IN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA'S ANTI-DUMPING LAW 20 (1919) [hereinafter TARIFF COMM'N REPORT]
(defining dumping as an unfair practice, even when predatory intent was lacking). That
Report was a significant part of the background to the 1921 legislation. But see H.R.
REP. 479, supra note 112, at 2 (relying heavily on the Tariff Commission Report).
117. H.R. REP. 479, supra note 112, at 1.
118. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 43 (1911); McGee, supra note
46, at 137 (1958); Comment, The Antidumping Act, supra note 18, at 718.
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Clayton Act in 1914. n1 The 1916 Act was phrased as an antitrust law
and was explicitly directed against predatory dumping. Congress
designed the 1921 Act to remedy the deficiencies of the 1916 Act.1 20
Finally, the committee's description of dumping as involving "unfair
methods of competition" implicitly refers to the condemnation, in 1914,
of "unfair methods of competition" in the Federal Trade Commission
Act.12
Further support for construing the 1921 Act as directed against
predatory dumping can be drawn from the Tariff Act of 1922.22 The
1922 Act contained provisions directed against "unfair methods of
competition" and "unfair acts in the importation of articles into the
United States,' 23 provisions widely recognized at the time as directed
against predatory dumping. 2 ' The 1922 Act followed the recommenda-
tions of the Tariff Commission's critique of the 1916 Act.' 20 The con-
tention by the sponsors of the Tariff Act of 1922 that these prohibitions
were more effective than the antidumping statutes reinforces the view
that the 1921 Act was directed at predatory pricing, since the descrip-
tion of the 1922 legislation as more effective protection would not have
119. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988).
120. See H.R. REP. No. 479, supra note 112, at 2 (criticizing the 1916 Act).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). See supra note I I and accompanying text (elaborating
on provisions of the Clayton Act).
122. Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 943. Similar provisions are now contained in 19
U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
123. Tariff Act of 1922, § 316 (providing in part:
(a) That unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of
articles into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee,
or agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially
injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United States, or
to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize
trade and commerce in the United States, are hereby declared unlawful, and
when found by the President to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any other
provisions of law, as hereinafter provided.
(e) That whenever the existence of any such unfair method or act shall be estab-
lished to the satisfaction of the President he shall determine the rate of addi-
tional duty, not exceeding 50 nor less than 10 percentum of the value of such
articles ... which will offset such method or act, and which is hereby imposed
upon articles imported in violation of this Act, or, in what he shall be satisfied
and find are extreme cases of unfair methods or acts as aforesaid, he shall direct
that such articles as he shall deem the interests of the United States shall re-
quire, imported by any person violating the provisions of this Act, shall be ex-
cluded from entry into the United States ...).
Section 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922 was the antecedent of the provisions now con-
tained in 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
124. See J. Viner, supra note 112, at 147.
125. Id.
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been accurate had the scope of that legislation been narrower than the
then recently-enacted 1921 legislation.'26
In the first quarter of the twentieth century, Congress enacted sev-
eral statutes that were directed against predatory pricing: Congress
targeted predatory pricing in section two of the Clayton Act in 1914,127
in the Antidumping Act of 1916,128 and in the unfair competition pro-
visions of the Tariff Act of 1922.11" In addition, predatory pricing was
probably within the scope of the Federal Trade Commission Act's ban
on "unfair methods of competition" 130 as it was within the ban of simi-
lar words in the Tariff Act of 1922.131 There is no doubt that the 1921
Act targets predatory dumping. Whether the 1921 Act is directed
against other behavior as well is considered below.
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PREDATORY PRICING ANALYSIS
AND THE ANTIDUMPING LAWS
When Congress enacted the 1921 Act, it may have acted in the be-
lief that the legislation would protect American business from unfair
price discrimination similar to that prohibited by the Sherman and
Clayton Acts.' 32 While the 1921 Act does not contain the predatory
intent requirement present in the 1916 Act, it does include an injury
requirement that largely tracks the intent provisions of the 1916 Act. 33
Moreover, the administrative enforcement machinery of the 1921
Act'34 may have been designed to limit the act's application to preda-
tory or otherwise unfair behavior. Congress probably decided to phrase
the 1921 Act broadly to avoid the procedural problems 3 5 impeding en-
126. Id.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988).
128. Antidumping Act of 1916, § 801, 39 Stat. 798 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 72 (1988)).
129. Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337
(1988)).
130. Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1988)).
131. Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 852, supra note 129.
132. H.R. REP. No. 479, supra note 112, at 2 (noting several objections to the
1916 Act).
133. 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1988).
134. Antidumping Act of 1916, § 803, 39 Stat. 799 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 72 (1988)).
135. See H.R. REP. No. 479, supra note 112, at 2 (stating that the principal objec-
tions to the 1916 Act seem to have been that no relief could be granted under the Act
unless predatory intent was established, and it was exceedingly difficult to prove preda-
tory intent; second, the 1916 Act prohibitions ran against the importers who would be
persons unlikely to possess the requisite predatory intent; and third, since it carried
criminal as well as civil penalties, it was believed that the Act had to be strictly con-
strued). Objection was also made to the 1916 Act on the ground that it covered only
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forcement of the 1916 Act, but by entrusting the administration of the
1921 Act to the secretary of the Treasury, Congress hoped to constrain
the scope of the Act's practical application.
The 1921 Act remained the primary antidumping law until the en-
actment of the Trade Agreements Act in 1979 (1979 Act).13 Congress
intended the 1979 Act to bring United States law into conformity with
the then recently negotiated GATT antidumping and countervailing
duty codes.137 Congress formally repealed the provisions of the 1921
Act""' but substantially reenacted them as an amendment adding Title
VII to the Tariff Act of 1930.139 When I refer below to the Antidump-
ing Act, it is this reenactment to which I refer unless I state otherwise.
Several events since the mid-1970s have injected flux into the inter-
pretation of the Antidumping Act. In 1974, Congress amended the An-
tidumping Act to include below-cost sales in the United States within
the rubric of dumping, regardless of the price at which the product was
being sold in its home market. 14 0 The Antidumping Act brought such
sales within its scope by defining dumping as sales in the United States
at less than "fair value."141 The Trade Act of 1974 (1974 Act) rede-
fined fair value as not less than cost.14 2 The result was that below-cost
sales within the United States fell under the sweep of the Antidumping
Act even though home-market sales were made at identical, albeit be-
low-cost, prices.' 43 Proof of injury to a domestic industry as a result of
dumping "commonly and systematically" carried on. Id. Moreover, the burdens of
proof were believed to exceed the practical abilities of most private plaintiffs to sustain.
Id.; J. VINER, supra note 112, at 244-45 (1923); Tariff Comm'n Report, supra note
116, at 18, 20, 33.
136. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 106, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144.
137. Knoll, United States Antidumping Law: The Case for Reconsideration, 22
TEXAS INT'L L.J. 265, 269 (1987).
138. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 106, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 193.
139. Id. § 101, 93 Stat. 162 (1979). Title VII is codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-
1677g (1988).
140. Trade Act of 1974, § 321, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2043 (1974) (codified
at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677g (1988)).
141. Id., 88 Stat. 2044.
142. Id., 88 Stat. 2043, 2046 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b)
(1988)).
143. Id. § 321(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1988)). Under the present
law, home market sales at less than the cost of production are disregarded for purposes
of determining foreign market value. When below-cost home-market prices are disre-
garded, then home-market value must be constructed by calculating production cost
plus imputed general expenses of 10% and profit of eight percent. 19 U.S.C. §
1677b(e) (1988). Below-cost sales in the United States are then compared with this
constructed home-market price with the result that below-cost sales in the United
States will always be deemed to be dumping sales.
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such below-cost sales now justifies the imposition of antidumping
duties.
The 1974 Act provisions dealing with below-cost sales appear to un-
dercut the traditional cross-market subsidy rationale which was a pre-
mise of both the 1916 and 1921 Acts. 4  After all, falling de-
mand-rather than some unfair tactic-would often be the reason why
a firm would sell at below-average-total-cost prices in all markets. No
business firm, however, can sell all of its products at below-cost prices
indefinitely without a subsidy of some kind. In the congressional view,
persistent sales below cost (including home market sales) suggest that
the producer is, or has been, the beneficiary of a government subsidy.
On this view, dumping, as redefined in 1974, would continue to be con-
nected with subsidy; the 1974 Act thus recognizes, in addition to the
traditional cross-market subsidy, direct subsidization from the dumping
firm's government as an essential ingredient in dumping. Moreover,
Congress reaffirmed its belief in the subsidy rationale when the 1974
Act extended the reach of the Antidumping Act to certain operations
of multinational corporations. 45 Under the 1974 legislation, the An-
tidumping Act reaches multinationals that sell in the United States at
prices lower than those in third-country markets, even though their
home-country prices are not higher than the American prices. 148 Con-
gress reasoned that in such situations, revenues from third countries
could subsidize the low price sales in the American market. 47 Congress
thus reaffirmed its belief in using a subsidy model of dumping injury.
Accordingly, the low American prices are causally related to the higher
prices abroad; it is the revenues from the latter that make the former
possible.' 48
This recent reaffirmation of the subsidy model is consistent with the
view that the antidumping laws are directed not just at low United
States prices charged by foreign producers but also against two sets of
interrelated prices. A similar concept involving domestic price discrimi-
nation arises under the Robinson-Patman Act. 49 Persons complaining
144. See supra notes 19-28; 103-31 and accompanying text (stating the basis for
the 1916 and 1921 antidumping legislation).
145. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(d) (1988) (outlining the special rule for multinational
corporations).
146. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(d)(3) (1988).
147. S. REP. No. 1298, reprinted in 4 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 7186, 7188-89 (1974) (noting that trade cannot be isolated from world economic
influences).
148. Id.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)-(f) (1988). The subsidy concept first appeared in the legis-
lative history to the original section two of the Clayton Act. See text at note 100, supra
(discussing the legislative history of section two of the Clayton Act).
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of injury under the Robinson-Patman Act must prove, in addition to
the impact of the defendant's low prices, that their injury results from
the discrimination which consists of a combination of high and low
prices.1 50 Under the Robinson-Patman Act, the causal connection be-
tween the injury and the combination of high and low prices may be
established by showing that the revenue from the high prices financed
otherwise staggering losses incurred when the firm sold at below-margi-
nal-cost levels in another market.151
The history of antidumping legislation suggests that Congress has
believed that a relationship exists between a dumping firm's high home-
market prices and its low American prices. The close relationship be-
tween the 1916 Act and the Clayton Act suggests that the subsidy
model of price discrimination underlay both acts. The subsidy model,
however, is particularly adapted to legislation directed against preda-
tory pricing, like the Clayton Act and the 1916 Act. To the extent that
the 1921 Act and subsequent revisions have been directed against non-
predatory behavior, a different understanding of the connection be-
tween the dumper's high and low prices must underlie that legislation.
Congressional concern that in the aftermath of World War I foreign
cartels would be seeking to dispose of excess production in the United
States underlay the 1921 Act. Concerns about the likely impact of
foreign cartel pricing suggest that some congressional backers of an-
tidumping legislation perceived a relationship between the high and low
prices different from that embodied in the subsidy model. That rela-
tionship involved the use of dumping as a device to lower unit costs in
industries with heavy fixed costs by producing in volume without erod-
ing away high foreign home-market prices established through cartel
behavior. 53 Although the foreign sellers might not possess predatory
motives, they could, nonetheless, be viewed as drawing upon protected
150. See, e.g., Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding that
a causal connection between the two levels of prices and the injury is necessary for
recovery under the Robinson-Patman Act); D. GIFFORD & L. RASKIND. FEDERAL AN-
TITRUST LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 589-93 (1983).
151. See Shore Gas & Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 224 F. Supp. 922,
926 (D.N.J. 1963) (holding that distributors' self-sustained lower price attracting an-
other distributor's customer did not violate the Clayton Act).
152. See H.R. Rep. No. 479, supra note 112; Ehrenhaft, supra note 116. at 45.
153. TARIFF CONIN'N REPORT, supra note 116, at 19 & n.2. (noting that the Tariff
Commission had pointed out that in industries with high fixed costs, dumping helps to
lower unit costs). The Commission itself, however, did not emphasize a connection be-
tween dumping and cartel behavior; nor did the Commission emphasize a connection
between dumping by foreign producers as a device for acquisition of market power in
the importing country. Id. Compare id. at 19 with H.R. REP. No. 479, supra note 112,
at 2-3 (both selectively quoting a report of the Alien Property Custodian).
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home-market monopoly positions to subject American rivals to persis-
tent competition from marginal-cost pricing. The monopoly revenues in
the home-market would thus be essential to marginal-cost pricing in
the American market. The monopoly prices in their protected home-
markets would provide coverage for fixed costs and generate profits,
thereby facilitating the foreign sellers' ability to price at marginal-cost
levels abroad. There is no subsidy in the sense that the export sales are
incurring losses. Indeed, the export sales may be reducing the unit costs
of the dumping firm by increasing sales volume in an industry with
scale economies. Yet, higher prices in a protected home-market would
provide the revenues that are a sine qua non for persistent marginal-
cost export pricing. A focus upon this kind of connection between the
high home-market prices and the low American prices would explain
some of the congressional references to dumping as unfair, monopolis-
tic, or anticompetitive, even when the dumping is being carried out
without predatory motives.
The legislative history of the 1974 Act indicates that such an under-
standing may have been incorporated in that act. The Senate report
accompanying the 1974 Act discusses the purposes of antidumping leg-
islation.154 The report seeks to justify antidumping legislation on the
154. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 147, at 7816 (reporting the following statement
directed to the subject of "technical dumping":
(1) Technical dumping.-The concept, underlying a number of International
Trade (Tariff) Commission determinations, is wholly consistent with the basic
philosophy and purpose of the Antidumping Act. This Act is not a 'protectionist'
statute designed to bar or restrict U.S. imports; rather, it is a statute designed to
free U.S. imports from unfair price discrimination practices. As is explained be-
low, this distinction is of importance in the context of recent suggestions that the
Antidumping Act should not be applied to imports of articles in short supply.
Conceptually, the Antidumping Act is not directed toward forcing foreign suppli-
ers to sell in the U.S. market at the same prices that they sell at in their home
markets. Rather, the Act is primarily concerned with the situation in which the
margin of dumping contributes to underselling the U.S. product in the domestic
market, resulting in injury or likelihood of injury to a domestic industry. Such
injury may be manifested by such indicators as suppression or depression of
prices, loss of customers, and penetration of the U.S. market. When clear indica-
tion of injury, or likelihood of injury, exists there would be reason for making an
affirmative determination. The Antidumping Act is designed to discourage and
prevent foreign suppliers from using unfair price discrimination practices to the
detriment of a United States industry.
On the other hand, the Antidumping Act does not proscribe transactions
which involve selling an imported product at a price which is not lower than that
needed to make the product competitive in the U.S. market, even though the
price of the imported product is lower than its home market price. Such so-called
'technical dumping' is not anti-competitive, hence, not unfair; it is procompetitive
in effect. The Commission has recognized the concept of technical dumping and
in a number of cases has made a negative determination in the circumstances of
such dumping. It is to be noted that in the usual short supply situation or infla-
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ground that it is directed against behavior which is unfair.151 The re-
port creates a dichotomy between fairness and competition on one hand
and unfairness and anticompetitiveness on the other."' 0 Thus, the re-
port asserts that the 1921 Act is "not a 'protectionist' statute designed
to bar or restrict U.S. imports" but rather was "a statute designed to
free U.S. imports from unfair price discrimination practices."'"* The
report repeats this theme by describing technical dumping as "not anti-
competitive, hence, not unfair. 15 8 Moreover, the report states that:
[T]he Act is primarily concerned with the situation in which the
margin of dumping contributes to underselling the U.S. product in
the domestic market, resulting in injury or likelihood of injury to
a domestic industry. Such injury may be manifested by such in-
dicators as suppression or depression of prices, loss of customers,
and penetration of the U.S. market .... The Antidumping Act is
designed to discourage and prevent foreign suppliers from using
unfair price discrimination practices to the detriment of a United
States industry.1"'
Although this language is contained in a Senate report accompanying
legislation which brought below-cost sales within the sweep of the An-
tidumping Act, 60 the analysis is concerned only with dumping in the
traditional form of international price discrimination.101 The Senate re-
port reveals several congressional assumptions. First, to conflict with
the Antidumping Act, the lower American price must be causally re-
lated to the higher home-market price. The language referring to "the
margin of dumping" as something which "contributes" to underselling
in the American market reflects this requirement. Second, it is this
tionary period, imports-regardless of home market price-would normally be
sold to the domestic market at a price no lower than the prevailing U.S. market
price, thus indicating that when dumping exists in such situations, it is likely to
be a case of technical dumping in which there is not likely to be injury to a
domestic industry. In other words, importers as prudent businessmen dealing
fairly would be interested in maximizing profits by selling at prices as high as the
U.S. market would bear. But if there is a margin of dumping in a tight supply
situation, it may be due to technical reasons, which would not be injurious to
domestic industries).
155. See id. (stating that the Antidumping Act is aimed primarily at unfair price
discrimination having a negative impact on United States industry).
156. See id. (noting that some forms of technical dumping are not anticompetitive).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (stating that the Antidumping Act
does not prevent the sale of an imported product at a price no lower than necessary to
make it competitive in the United States market).
161. Id.
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causal connection that the report considers "unfair." Third, it is against
the use of this "unfair" price discrimination to injure, actually or po-
tentially, an American industry at which the Antidumping Act is
directed.
A fourth, less apparent, assumption is that the foreign seller is a
price-maker, rather than a price-taker. This can be inferred from the
report's discussion of technical dumping.6 2 Technical dumping, as
treated in the report, involves sales in the American market at prevail-
ing American prices where the foreign sellers' activities have no signifi-
cant impact on American prices.16 3 Technical dumping does not fall
within the scope of the Antidumping Act because there is no causal
connection between the higher home-market prices and the lower
American market prices.16 4 The two price levels are not causally re-
lated since the foreign sellers take the American price as given. Indeed,
the foreign sellers do not significantly depress the American price be-
cause the foreign producers' sales in the United States are not suffi-
ciently large to affect American supply and demand equilibrium. The
innocuous nature of those sales would be recognized formally in the
injury determination: since there would be no significant impact on
American prices, there could be no "material injury" to a United
States industry. Consequently, no antidumping duties could be
imposed.16 5
Finally, a fifth congressional assumption has been that dumping
firms possess market power in their home markets. Foreign sellers can-
not practice price discrimination unless their home markets are pro-
tected and they themselves possess market power in those home mar-
kets. 166 When proponents of antidumping legislation referred to
dumping as monopolistic behavior characteristic of foreign cartels, they
were referring to the market power of foreign firms in their home mar-
kets.' 6 7 Thus, Congress has assumed that dumping in the American
market involves producers that possess market power both in their
home markets and in the American market.
162. Id.
163. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (defining technical dumping and
characterizing it as instances where foreign manufacturers seek to maximize profits by
selling their goods at prices not lower than needed to be competitive in the American
market).
164. Id.
165. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673(2), 1673d(b), 1677(7) (1988) (requiring a material
injury for the Antidumping Act to be imposed).
166. See S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 147, at 7200 (noting that the United States
cannot remain passive while other nations shelter their economies).
167. Id.
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C. FORMER CHAIRMAN LIEBELER'S FIVE-FACTOR TEST: IN THE
COMMISSION AND IN THE COURTS
The 1974 Senate report eventually influenced the decisions of the
International Trade Commission (ITC). In Certain Red Raspberries
from Canada,68 which the ITC decided in 1985, former Chairman Su-
san Liebeler, then Vice Chairman, wrote a concurring opinion that de-
veloped a five-factor test for assessing dumping cases. Liebeler derived
her analysis from the 1974 Senate committee report.6 0 She construed
the Senate report's discussion of "unfair price discrimination" as a ref-
erence to predatory pricing.17 0 Pricing is predatory when it is "below
the marginal cost of production. 117 1 Liebeler contended that predatory
behavior could exist only when the foreign sellers acquire a large and
growing market share and cause price deterioration, and she suggested
using these criteria as proxies for production cost data, which was un-
available. 1 2 She also proposed that the foreign firms possess market
power in the United States market, and she would use market share as
an indication of market power. 7 3 Liebeler drew her five-factor test
from the Antidumping Act's injury definition, which she interpreted as
a statutory concern with predatory pricing. In summary, Liebeler's five
factors are: "(1) large and increasing market share, (2) high dumping
margins, (3) homogeneous products, (4) declining prices and (5) barri-
ers to entry to other foreign producers (low elasticity of supply of other
imports) "74
The Antidumping Act supports Liebeler's first four factors. The first
and fourth factors are components of the statute's definition of in-
jury. 7 5 The third factor is closely tied to the injury requirement and
would have to be considered in the determination of the industry which
is allegedly injured. 7 1 The second factor, the dumping margin, goes to
the core of the Antidumping Act. The dumping margin must be calcu-
lated in order to establish the existence of dumping; and the connection
of that margin with domestic injury identified, in the collective mind of
the enacting Congress, the unfairness of the offense.'17
168. Certain Red Raspberries from Canada, USITC Pub. No. 1707, Inv. No. 731-
TA-196 (final) (June 1985).
169. Id. at 16.
170. Id. at 14.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 15.
173. Id. at 15-16.
174. Id. at 16.
175. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (1988).
176. Id. § 1677(4).
177. Id. § 1673.
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Liebeler's fifth factor, the existence of entry barriers, is only relevant
when the dumping is predatory. 178 In the full predatory scenario, once
it has driven its rivals from the market, the successful predator exploits
its newly achieved monopoly power by charging supracompetitive
prices. It can only do so effectively, however, if entry barriers prevent
new firms from entering, and, through their competition, eroding the
predator's monopoly. Although Leibeler's reading of the statute as con-
fined to predatory dumping has support in its legislative history, the
courts have rejected Liebeler's entry-barrier factor as inconsistent with
the statute.17 1
In USX Corp. v. United States, 80 the Court of International Trade
rejected Liebeler's five-factor analysis. The court stated that the An-
tidumping Act adopts an "injury to industry" approach and not the
"injury to competition" approach advocated by Liebeler.' 81 The latter
approach is incorporated into the 1916 Act but not into the 1921 Act
nor the 1979 reenactment. The court in USX did not dismiss predation
as a concern of the Antidumping Act. The court accepted Liebeler's
view that the Antidumping Act is directed against predatory pricing
but interpreted the Antidumping Act as being equally directed against
all dumping that produces an "injury to [American] industry."18'
V. THE ANTIDUMPING LAW REEXAMINED: TOWARDS A
RECONCILIATION OF DIFFERING POLICY APPROACHES
A. THE ANTIDUMPING ACT AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERMITTENT
DUMPING
Congress clearly directed the Antidumping Act against foreign sell-
ers that practice predatory dumping.'83 The Antidumping Act, how-
ever, may be directed against a wider range of conduct than predatory
dumping.
In the early twentieth century, commentators divided dumping into
three categories: persistent, intermittent, and sporadic dumping. The
Tariff Commission referred to "sporadic" dumping, and Jacob Viner,
in his classic work on dumping, used all three categories.' 84 Many legal
178. Certain Red Raspberries from Canada, supra note 168, at 18.
179. Trent Tube Div. v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 921, 927 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1990); USX Corp. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 60, 68 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
180. 682 F. Supp. 60 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
181. Id. at 65.
182. Id. at 66.
183. See supra notes 110-67 and accompanying text (describing the concerns be-
hind the enactment of the Antidumping Act).
184. J. VINER, supra note 112, at 23.
[VOL. 6:277
ANTIDUMPING AND ANTITRUST LAWS
commentators continue to use these categories today. 185 Persistent and
intermittent dumping are systematic, differing only in that the former
continues indefinitely while the latter does not. Sporadic dumping in-
volves the disposal by foreign firms of unanticipated surplus production
abroad at market-clearing prices. 86 Because sporadic dumping occurs
in response to production miscalculations or unexpected changes in
market conditions and therefore does not last for extended periods, it
generally does not threaten the economic viability of domestic
producers.187
Systematic dumping is more threatening than sporadic dumping. Al-
though the Tariff Commission voiced some apprehension about persis-
tent dumping in its 1919 report, the Tariff Commission nonetheless rec-
ognized its benefits. 88 Persistent dumping involves a firm or group of
firms selling abroad indefinitely at prices lower than those in their
home markets.1 89 Such dumping benefits the importing countries by
providing them with reliable and permanent low cost supplies.90° For
this reason, experts have long recognized that there can be no sound
objection to persistent dumping. Viner expressed his concern that
dumping that appeared to be persistent might not in fact continue in-
definitely. 91 The Tariff Commission report stated a similar concern. 92
Intermittent dumping forces producers in the importing countries to
meet dumping prices for sustained periods. Yet, due to its impermanent
nature, intermittent dumping does not provide the importing countries
with a permanent source of inexpensive supplies. Instead, the older crit-
185. See, e.g., Ehrenhaft, supra note 116, at 46-48 (giving definitions of dumping
terms); see also, C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 25, at 275 (defining intermittent, spo-
radic, and persistent dumping); J. VINER, supra note 112, at 23 (providing explanations
of the commonly used categories of intermittent, sporadic and persistent dumping);
Note, Economically Meaningful Markets: An Alternative Approach to Defining "'Like
Product" and "Domestic Industry" under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. 73 VA.
L. REV. 1459, 1463 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Economically Meaningful Markets]
(defining the types of dumping and citing Viner as the primary source for these terms).
186. See H. HOVENKAMP, EcONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 13.2
(1985) (noting that sporadic price discrimination generally occurs in competitive
markets).
187. See Note, Economically Meaningful Markets, supra note 185. at 1463 (stat-
ing that the effects of sporadic dumping are negligible).
188. TARIFF COMNIN'N REPORT, supra note 116, at 19-20.
189. See id. (asserting that while dumping is beneficial to the importing country, it
is harmful to the exporting country because consumers in the exporting country are
forced to pay monopoly prices).
190. See C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 25, at 276 (noting that persistent dumping
occurs when a producer consistently regards two markets differently in terms of over-
head costs).
191. J. VINER, supra note 112, at 139.
192. TARIFF COMM'N REPORT, supra note 116, at 19.
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ics argued that intermittent dumping jeopardizes the profitability of
long-term investment in the importing countries, thereby threatening
the ability of the importing countries to meet their long-term needs.
B. THE CONDITIONS GIVING RISE TO INTERMITTENT DUMPING: A
PROTECTED HOME MARKET, OLIGOPOLISTIC PRICING, HEAVY FIXED
COSTS
Sustained dumping can only occur if trade barriers protect the pro-
ducers' home market from competition from rivals located in other na-
tions. Prices in the home market for basic commodities, such as the
steel and chemicals dumped by the Germans earlier in the twentieth
century, 193 cannot exceed prices offered elsewhere, in the absence of
government-imposed trade barriers such as tariffs or quotas."" For
more sophisticated products requiring extensive backups, such as spare
parts distribution and networks of repair and maintenance facilities,
barriers to entry can take the form of restricted access to distribution
systems.
In the absence of such trade barriers, producers from elsewhere
would divert sales to the market with the higher prices, thus forcing
prices in the dumping firm's home market down to prevailing world
levels. A protected home market in any internationally traded good is
thus a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the development of a
noncompetitive industrial structure in the home market. Because
dumping involves price discrimination, the higher home-market price
may reflect collusive or otherwise noncompetitive pricing in the home
market. Finally, for intermittent dumping to jeopardize needed long-
term investment in the importing country, the affected industry would
probably bear heavy fixed costs amortized over many years. These in-
dustry characteristics, which seem to have been assumed in the dump-
ing debates of the early twentieth century, may help to reveal Con-
gress' intent in enacting the Antidumping Act.
C. THE VIEW OF INTERMITTENT DUMPING AS AN UNFAIR PRACTICE
During the early part of this century, dumping was widely perceived
in the United States as a characteristic behavior pattern of foreign car-
193. G. VON HABERLER, THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 315 (1936) (re-
porting early twentieth century German dumping of iron and steel at prices 50% below
the German price). German dumping involved not sales to the United States but to
Holland and England. Id.
194. Id.
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tels, especially the German steel and chemical cartels.115 Those cartels
were seen as restricting home-market sales in order to impose
supracompetitive home-market prices.19 8 When demand slackened, the
cartels would not reduce their high home-market prices. Instead, they
would maintain prices in their home markets while attempting to offset
the adverse effect of falling home-market demand on their unit produc-
tion costs by dumping abroad.9 7
In this view, the foreign producers operated with high fixed or
"sunk" costs. 98 As those fixed costs were distributed over increasing
units of output, the average fixed cost declined. A high fixed cost com-
ponent for the initial output pressured these producers to maintain a
large output in order to keep average unit cost low. Selling abroad at
low prices which exceeded the marginal cost of production but did not
cover average costs minimized unit costs and facilitated the exploita-
tion of the home-market monopoly. 19
This view of dumping influenced the attitude in the United States
that dumping is an "unfair" and "monopolistic" practice. 00 Sustained
dumping was associated with monopolistic pricing in a protected home
market. Intermittent dumping carried out by protected foreign cartels
could be viewed as systematically exporting to the American market
excess production necessary to achieve low unit costs. The cartels could
not dispose of their excess production in their home markets without
drastically reducing prices there. Such dumping could thus be viewed
195. See TARIFF CONINI'N REPORT, supra note 116, at 14; Ehrenhaft, supra note
116, at 51, 53; G. VON HABERLER, supra note 193.
196. Viner, supra note 112, at 51.
197. See id. at 95.
198. Id. at 112-17.
199. Indeed, it is not much of an extrapolation from the scenario described in the
House and Senate Reports on section two of the Clayton Act to make the connection
between foreign monopoly and discriminatorily low prices in the United States. The
House and Senate Reports on section two describe domestic price discrimination by the
Standard Oil Company which, as described, appears predatory. H.R. REP. No. 627,
supra note 40, at 8-9. Standard Oil sold at low prices in one locality in order to drive
out its rivals and achieve a monopoly while it sold at monopoly prices in those regions
where it already possessed a monopoly. Id. The extrapolation would explain Standard
Oil's low prices in the competitive markets by its need to maintain production volume
in order to minimize costs in a situation in which it was experiencing scale economies.
If Standard Oil were able to provide a continuous and permanent source of supply to
all of the regions which it was serving, then its behavior-on this view-would have
been unobjectionable. Only if it were selling in the low-price regions intermittently,
during periods of demand slack in the monopoly regions, while maintaining high prices
in those monopoly regions, would Standard Oil be engaging in behavior resembling the
price discrimination which in the international context has been called intermittent
dumping.
200. Id.
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as an incident of monopoly pricing abroad which effectively subsidized
(short-run) marginal-cost pricing in the United States.
Intermittent dumping could also be viewed as unfair because similar
behavior confined to the domestic market would violate accepted ca-
nons of legitimate business behavior. The antitrust laws have signifi-
cantly influenced these canons of behavior.2 1' Because the disposal by a
regional domestic cartel of its surplus production in another domestic
regional market would likely be viewed as integral to the operation of
the cartel, that behavior would itself constitute an antitrust violation.
Moreover, the combination of monopoly pricing and disposition of sur-
plus production out of the regionally restricted market probably consti-
tutes an "unfair trade practice" under section five of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, providing further ground for characterizing the diver-
sion of the surplus as "unfair". 0 2
Whether the view just sketched had substantial basis in actual be-
havior is less important for present purposes than whether such a view
helped to shape American antidumping legislation. To the extent that
this view was influential, it is a guide to the intentions of the enacting
Congress and can help to shape the administration of the Antidumping
Act. Furthermore, this view helps explain the description of dumping in
that Act's legislative history as involving practices which were both un-
fair and monopolistic.
There is a significant difference between exports to the American
market of foreign production surplus created by monopolistic restric-
tions of home-market sales and of surplus resulting from falling de-
mand. The surplus caused by falling demand arises solely from the op-
eration of market forces. If American producers were as free to export
surplus abroad as foreign firms were to export to the American market,
all producers would be on the same footing. The more efficient produc-
ers would ultimately survive periods of low demand. By contrast, export
of surplus due to monopolistic restrictions implies a protected home
market, from which American producers are permanently excluded.
Moreover, monopolistic restrictions in the home market of the foreign
sellers increase the surplus exported to the American market. These are
the historic concerns. More recently, concerns have focused on whether
the dumping firms are exploiting advantages conferred upon them by
their governments.20 3 If the dumping firms benefit from a protected
201. See supra notes 1-18 and accompanying text (discussing the formulation of
American antitrust and trade laws).
202. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1988) (prohibiting unfair trade practices).
203. See, e.g., P. KRUGMAN, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL TRADE 191 (1990).
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home market, that protection may provide them with the benefits of
scale economies, which in turn enable them to enter foreign markets
with lower unit costs than they could attain without a protected home
market.201 Thus, in this perspective, both foreign surplus caused by mo-
nopolistic restrictions on sales in the dumpers' home market and low
dumping prices facilitated by economies attained through government
protection reflect the unfairness of dumping.205 Dumping effectively
consists of foreign governments taxing their home-market consumers to
confer market-distorting advantages upon their producers.
Jacob Viner,208 who wrote in the 1920s, expressed views compatible
with this model but which were hostile to all dumping that is not spo-
radic or persistent. According to Viner, neither sporadic nor persistent
dumping creates problems for an importing country because the former
does not seriously threaten producers and the latter benefits the import-
ing country by providing it with a permanent source of low-cost sup-
plies.20 7 Viner did object to intermittent dumping, however.20 8 Intermit-
tent dumping involves sales of goods at bargain prices but only for a
short, unpredictable term.209 Such dumping often threatens the exis-
tence of efficient and viable domestic industries that offer dependable
supplies for the long run.2 10 Viner's concern with the long run was the
primary cause of his opposition to short-run bargains which, as he saw
it, threatened efficient long-term sources of supplies.21' Thus, despite
the theoretical attractiveness of permanent or persistent dumping,
Viner concluded that all dumping should be presumed objectionable
because there was no way of determining in advance whether an inci-
dence of dumping would continue for a long period.21 2
204. Id. at 191, 195, 197.
205. Krugman shows that government protection can provide an advantage to that
nation's exporters. Id. The exploitation of that advantage may be perceived as "unfair"
by rival producers in the importing country who lack both those advantages and access
to the home market of their foreign rivals.
206. J. VINER, supra note 112.
207. Id. at 138-39.
208. Id. at 140.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 139. Viner states:
There is no practical means whereby an importing country can discriminate be-
forehand between dumping which is destined to continue indefinitely and dump-
ing which will cease after a few months or years. In general the presumption
must be that any instance of dumping will prove after the event to have been
short-run, if not sporadic.
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For similar reasons, Viner objected to below-cost pricing. Viner fa-
vored prohibiting foreign producers from selling at below-cost prices in
the American market" 3 even when they sell at the same below-cost
prices in their home markets." 4 He argued that such pricing is always
temporary because no firm can maintain below-cost prices in all mar-
kets indefinitely.2 15 Accordingly, Viner believed that foreign producers
who sell below-cost in all markets threaten efficient domestic producers
without offering an alternative long-term supply source.21 6 Restating
his position in terms of free trade analysis, Viner argued that intermit-
tent dumping and below-cost pricing are likely to divert "commerce
and industry" out of "their natural channels," thereby conflicting with
the objectives of free trade.2"'
Viner relies on several implicit assumptions. First, the dumping prac-
tices that he is discussing are being carried out by industries with large
fixed costs, where allocation per unit of output declines as output in-
creases.2"8 These industries require large investments which are com-
mitted for long periods.2"9 Intermittent dumping, therefore, can wreak
havoc with the return on such investments and the prospect of unpre-
dictable intermittent dumping can, therefore, discourage investment.220
Second, Viner assumes that dumping prices are below the average unit
cost.22' Viner does not so state, but unless the foreign producers sell in
the American market at prices below their average costs, they cannot
threaten the survival of equally efficient American rivals.222
Viner's use of a free trade rationale to critique the practice of inter-
mittent dumping directs attention to the home market of the dumping
firms. Without protection, sustained dumping would be impossible, as
would monopolistic restriction of sales in the home market of the
dumping firms. 223 Instead, their survival would be determined by their
comparative efficiencies.224 Protected home markets enable producers
to practice price discrimination and distort worldwide commerce, inter-
213. Viner is primarily addressing American public policy. Id.
214. Id. at 147.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 138-39.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 140.
221. Id. at 147.
222. Id.
223. See S. REp. No. 1298, supra note 147, at 7200.
224. J. VINER, supra note 112, at 140.
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fering with "natural channels" in accordance with laws of comparative
advantage and relative efficiencies. 22 5
Viner incorrectly assumes that the benefits of foreign dumping, even
if only intermittent, are necessarily unpredictable. If identified foreign
cartels practice dumping during periods of economic recession, the im-
pact of surplus production on the American market could be predict-
able, at least in the sense that foreign surplus would arrive in a cyclical
fashion. American producers could thus make their investment plans
accordingly and American consumers would profit from the low cost of
the foreign supplies. Thus, intermittent dumping is not always unpre-
dictable. Viner's theoretical point that the prospect of unpredictable
dumping at below-cost prices can discourage long term investment in
efficient production facilities nevertheless remains valid. 20 As uncer-
tainty increases, so do risk and cost, resulting in lower returns and de-
creased investment incentives.
Viner has been criticized for his opposition to nonpredatory intermit-
tent dumping.2 27 Professor John Barcello228 argues that Viner fails to
give adequate weight to the increased consumer surplus in the import-
ing country during the dumping period. Barcello also states that Viner
fails to consider that even cyclical dumping can disrupt patterns of
oligopolistic pricing in the importing market. Barcello addresses the is-
sue of investment incentives in the importing country when he ques-
tions whether prices in the importing country will have to be higher
during the post-dumping period to compensate for the revenue lost dur-
ing the dumping period.229 Assuming a competitive market in the im-
porting country and prices during the dumping period at levels below
production costs in the importing country, revenue would have to rise
during the post-dumping period in order to maintain producers' incen-
tive to reinvest.
Viner's basic approach to nonpredatory intermittent dumping needs
revision. Yet, the selection of an optimal dumping policy is not an easy
task because the impact of antidumping duties is complex and involves
difficult, and often hidden, policy issues. Commentators acknowledge
that the trade barriers which facilitate dumping distort commerce, en-
225. See Fisher, Dumping: Confronting the Paradox of Internal Weakness and
External Challenge, in ANTIDUMPING LAW: POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION, I MICH.
Y.B. INT. LEGAL STUDIES 11, 23 (1979) (providing a similar argument focusing upon
the distortion imposed by dumping and the trade barriers that facilitate it).
226. J. VINER, supra note 112, at 140.
227. Barcello, The Antidumping Law.: Repeal It or Revise It, I ANTIDUMPING
LAW: POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION, I MICH. Y.B. INT. LEGAL STUDIES 53, 73-74.
228. Id. at 73.
229. Id. at 74.
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gender supracompetitive prices in the home market of the dumping
producers, and misallocate world resources. °30 Most commentators then
argue from a position that accepts the domestic monopoly of the dump-
ing firms and the trade barriers protecting it.23' In their view, the rele-
vant issues are the costs and benefits of dumping to the importing na-
tion.2" 2 These commentators argue that the consumers of the importing
market ultimately benefit from the dumping, even though producers in
the importing country incur a loss of sales and reduced prices.2 33 Other
commentators, however, point out that when goods are sold in the im-
porting country for prices above the marginal costs of the producers in
that country, duties causing diversion of sales from the dumping pro-
ducers to the importing country's producers will produce both positive
and negative effects on the importing country and are likely to increase
overall welfare in the importing country.2 4 The negative effects consist
of: (1) a reduction of consumer surplus as a result of higher prices on
goods purchased; and (2) a reduction of consumer surplus as a result of
the reduction of the total amount of goods sold. The positive ramifica-
tions consist of: (1) an increase in producer surplus on the goods sold
by domestic producers resulting from the price increase as applied to
their preexisting sales volume; (2) an increase in producer surplus of
domestic producers resulting from the diversion of sales from the for-
eign producers to the domestic producers; and (3) the increased reve-
nues to the treasury of the importing country from duties on the im-
ported goods. As long as the positive elements outweigh the negative,
the importing country benefits from the duties.235
230. See generally Note, Economically Meaningful Markets, supra note 185.
231. See C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 25, at 275-76.
232. Note, Economically Meaningful Markets, supra note 185, at 1459.
233. J. VINER, supra note 112, at 138.
234. C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 25, at 276-77.
235. See E. HELPMAN & P. KRUGMAN, TRADE POLICY AND MARKET STRUCTURE
120 (1989); see also P. LINDERT & C. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
168 & n.2 (7th ed. 1982). Lindert and Kindleberger provide an example in which a
duty has the effect of depressing the exporters' prices. Higher consumer prices in the
importing nation are more than offset by the combination of the producer price reduc-
tion and the duty paid to the importing nation's treasury. These authors state that
although the importing nation benefits, the reduction in sales which results from the
higher consumer prices is a welfare loss which, from a worldwide perspective, is not
offset by the price reduction, since that is merely a redistribution from the exporters to
the importing nation.
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D. THE APPROACHES OF VINER AND LIEBELER COMPARED
Viner condemns both predatory 3  and nonpredatory intermittent
dumping.237 As traditionally understood, predatory dumping occurs for
a sustained period, but not indefinitely. 235 The dumping lasts suffi-
ciently long to drive rivals from the market and to secure market power
for the predator. Because of the sustained length of the dumping period
and the impact upon the domestic firms, predatory dumping appears to
meet Viner's description of intermittent dumping. 239 Although actual
instances of predatory dumping are difficult to identify, there is close to
universal agreement that predatory dumping should be condemned. 240
Intermittent dumping, however, need not be predatorially motivated.
Although nonpredatory intermittent dumping by foreign producers is
detrimental to domestic firms, the foreign producers do not intend to
destroy the local firms.241 Nevertheless, foreign producers do intend to
operate in a way which is inconsistent with free competition overall.
Their below-cost prices on the domestic market reflect (and are depen-
dent upon) their intention to maintain monopoly restrictions in their
home market.242
Viner argued that dumping firms violate competitive norms and are
likely to distort the trade patterns that would emerge under free
trade.24 3 Consequently, Viner condemned both predatory and non-
predatory intermittent dumping. While most commentators agree with
Viner that predatory dumping is objectionable, they no longer widely
condemn nonpredatory intermittent dumping.24 Indeed, Liebeler's re-
visionist interpretation of the 1921 Act as focusing solely upon preda-
tory behavior constitutes a narrower focus than Viner's and reflects a
236. J. VINER, supra note 112, at 146-47.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 245.
239. Although Viner describes intermittent dumping as "short-run", it is nonethe-
less sustained for a substantial period. Neither intermittent dumping nor predatory
dumping are sustained indefinitely. Predatory dumping, therefore, appears more con-
sistent with Viner's category of "intermittent" than "permanent" dumping. See J.
VINER, supra note 112, at 29-31.
240. See Barcello, supra note 227, at 65-67. Professor Barcello observes that preda-
tory dumping is probably rare. He argues that it should be controlled under the Sher-
man Act. Id.
241. Nonpredatory dumping, by definition, means that the dumping firms lack a
predatory intent. A discussion of predatory behavior is contained in text, supra, at
notes 95-104.
242. See text at notes 193-205, supra (pointing out that sustained dumping is
inconsistent with competitive behavior.
243. Id. at 147.
244. See Certain Red Raspberries from Canada, supra note 168, at 17-18 (expres-
sing then vice-chairman Liebler's view that dumping might not cause injury).
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wide range of current thinking.24 5 Moreover, Liebeler's view draws sup-
port from the legislative history of the Antidumping Act.'4"
It does, however, appear possible to reconcile these different ap-
proaches, at least in substantial part. Both Viner and Liebeler believed
that the 1921 Act is concerned with maintaining competition. Liebeler
contends that a predatory standard will achieve that result,2 47 whereas
Viner argued for a broader standard as necessary to harmonize an-
tidumping legislation and procompetitive marketplace results.2 48 Be-
cause the courts have rejected Liebeler's predatory standard, a broader
approach to competition than hers is necessary to rescue the Antidump-
ing Act from a purely protectionist construction.
Viner correctly indicated that unpredictability and risk raise the cost
of investment. 49 Increases and decreases in the cost of investment, re-
gardless of their causes, allocate new investments to their most produc-
tive uses. 250 In condemning intermittent dumping because it is likely to
raise investment costs, 25' Viner in effect asserted that there are some
identifiable kinds of uncertainty, different from the broad range of
market uncertainties affecting business behavior, which should not be
permitted to increase the costs of investment. Indeed, Viner viewed the
effects of intermittent dumping as equivalent to market distortions.
Viner does not seem to have condemned intermittent dumping on
moral grounds. Instead, he merely argued that prohibiting dumping is
justified by the long-run benefits of an adequate investment base in the
affected industry.252 The congressional backers of the 1921 Act, and
those who have modified and reaffirmed that act, have similarly sought
to protect investment against the uncertainties of intermittent dump-
ing.' 53 Their position, however, carries a moral tone absent from
Viner's argumentation: it seems that the uncertainties generated by
dumping differ from other uncertainties because dumping is viewed as
"unfair," reflecting monopolistic behavior in closed foreign markets.
245. Id.
246. See supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text (illustrating support for
Liebeler's view).
247. See Certain Red Raspberries from Canada, supra note 168, at 17-18 (noting
that Congress sought to remedy only injurious dumping).
248. J. VINER, supra note 112, at 140.
249. USX Corp. v. United States, 682 F.Supp. 60, 68 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (dem-
onstrating the rejection of Liebeler's approach).
250. See, e.g.. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION: COMPETI-
TION, COORDINATION & CONTROL 304-05 (2d ed. 1977).
251. J. VINER, supra note 112, at 140.
252. Id. at 147.
253. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing congressional views on
the subject).
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Strategic trade policy analysis also supports this unfairness view be-
cause it shows that in certain circumstances, a protected home market
can confer a cost advantage on producers which they can exploit in
their export sales.254 Since protected home markets and low export
prices characterize dumping, 255 a case can be made that systematic
dumping behavior is a manifestation of unfair or even anticompetitive
behavior.
When Congress amended the Antidumping Act in 1974 to bring be-
low-cost sales within its scope,256 it may have adopted Viner's view that
below-cost sales in both the home and export markets are necessarily
temporary and produce the same negative effects on investment as
those generated by intermittent dumping. Congress may have believed
that such below-cost sales in the home and export markets reflected
overcapacity due to foreign-government subsidies, protection, and other
forms of encouragement. Perhaps Congress believed that foreign over-
capacity should not affect investment decisions in the United States
when such overcapacity does not result from pure market forces. Con-
gress has consistently expressed its concern with foreign-government
subsidies through legislation designed to identify such subsidies and to
subject subsidized imports to countervailing duties.257 The below-cost
provisions of the 1974 amendments to the Antidumping Act probably
reflect the view of some members of Congress that foreign sales at be-
low-cost levels were the result of the overcapacity caused by foreign
government subsidies, 258 and that the resulting below-cost sales in the
United States constituted "unfair" behavior from which American in-
vestors deserved protection.259
Viner's concern about discouragement of investment engendered by
the uncertainties of dumping, 2 0 coupled with the congressional concern
with below-cost sales in the 1974 Act,261 suggest a broader approach to
antidumping legislation than has so far prevailed. A renewed focus
upon below-cost dumping prices that threaten investment in efficient
254. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text (discussing trade policy
analysis).
255. Supra notes 193-205 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text (reviewing the 1974 amend-
ment and its underlying purpose).
257. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1671h (1988) (commanding the imposition of counter-
vailing duties).
258. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text (discussing the 1974
amendments).
259. Id.
260. J. VINER, supra note 112, at 146-47.
261. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (examining the 1974 amendment
and the corresponding congressional response).
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production facilities might be derived from Viner's historic concerns.
The Antidumping Act and its legislative history can be construed as
designed to encourage investment in industries with potential for long-
term growth at low production costs, but which are vulnerable to two
kinds of unacceptable risks. These unacceptable risks are market un-
certainties resulting from: (1) monopolistic behavior of foreign firms,
such as the sale in the United States of production which is made sur-
plus because of cartel or cartel-like restrictions in their home markets;
and (2) the sale in the United States at below-cost prices of the foreign
production of industries plagued by overcapacity resulting from for-
eign-government intervention through home-market subsidies, protec-
tion, or other significant market-distorting behavior.
This article suggests that antidumping legislation should focus on
those concerns long associated with the Antidumping Act. This inter-
pretation, however, emphasizes economic issues lost in the Antidump-
ing Act's administration. Because the Antidumping Act's creators saw
dumping in the form of price discrimination as a manifestation of car-
tel behavior,262 it is important to investigate the home-market structure
of accused foreign producers. A home market protected by official or
unofficial trade barriers combined with a high market concentration
should be a prerequisite to a dumping determination. In the absence of
such conditions, sales in the United States at prices below the foreign
home-market price should be deemed as nonactionable technical dump-
ing. This approach surely respects the spirit of the 1921 Act and its
several amendments.263
Below-cost sales in the United States should be linked to foreign-
government intervention before they should constitute the basis for the
imposition of antidumping duties. Domestic producers have no right to
be protected from the below-cost pricing of foreign or domestic rivals
when such pricing reflects industry overcapacity due to changes in de-
mand or overly optimistic projections by investors. In situations of over-
capacity, periods of intense price competition at prices falling to below
average-total-cost levels are the means through which the market ad-
justs capacity downwards. The Antidumping Act can be interpreted,
however, to protect American investors from foreign overinvestment re-
sulting from foreign-government market interventions. Such a construc-
tion of the Antidumping Act would limit the protection afforded to do-
262. See supra notes 132-53 and accompanying text (reviewing the Act's legislative
history and amendments).
263. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 147, at 7186 (articulating congressional views
on the 1921 Act).
[VOL. 6:277
ANTIDUMPING AND ANTITRUST LAWS
mestic industry by a free-market standard. Domestic producers would
be exposed to the risks of a truly free marketplace and would be pro-
tected only from the artificial risks imposed by the actions of foreign
governments. There is support for this construction in the Senate report
accompanying the 1974 Act.2 " The report disclaims any intention to
impose antidumping duties as a result of normal business practices
such as the sale of "obsolete or end-of-model-year merchandise at less
than cost. 265 This recognition that the market occasionally demands
selling below cost, combined with statements denying a protectionist
objective for the legislation,266 provide some limited grounds for read-
ing into the Antidumping Act's below-cost pricing provisions those
qualifications necessary to make them broadly consistent with a free-
market approach.
Finally, this slight shift of emphasis towards emphasizing foreign
market distortions in the enforcement of the Antidumping Act would
help to highlight the long-term United States trade goal of opening all
markets rather than of protecting domestic industry. With this change
of emphasis, every foreign producer accused of dumping would be
forced to defend market distortions in its home market. Conversely,
without those distortions in the home market, antidumping claims
would fail. Such a focus would bring the Antidumping Act into closer
harmony with antitrust objectives.
Thus, there is ample reason to reassess the policies underlying the
Antidumping Act. Regulators and courts need not administer the An-
tidumping Act with a narrow protectionist intent to preserve domestic
industries without considering the broader competitive contexts of the
entire industry and its world-wide structure.67 If the Antidumping Act
were administered to provide needed assurance to investors in indus-
tries where the free market identifies significant investment potential,
the Antidumping Act would be consistent with the competitive-market
concerns connected with the origins of antidumping legislation, with
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.; see also supra note 154 (quoting Senate Report 1298 defining technical
dumping). The law does, however, require the inclusion of minimum amounts for gen-
eral expenses and profit in the calculation of a foreign exporter's costs, thereby increas-
ing the likelihood that dumping will be found. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(B) (1988).
267. See S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 147, at 7186 and Note, Economically
Meaningful Markets, supra note 185 (urging the use of antitrust market definition
standards for delineating "product" and "industry" under the Antidumping Act). The
use of market definition standards would tend to broaden markets, reducing the likeli-
hood of a finding of injury. Such standards would also assist in moving the administra-
tion of the Antidumping Act closer to the competitive-market orientation of the anti-
trust laws. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 147, at 7186.
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the repeated congressional statements that the act is designed to rise to
a higher level of social purpose than simple protectionism, and with the
long-term administrative practice broadening coverage to protection
against more than predatory pricing.
E. THE POTENTIAL FOR REASSESSMENT SUMMARIZED
A reexamination of the Antidumping Act in its historical context
reveals that in the first part of this century, Congress was broadly con-
cerned with monopolistic practices and price discrimination at home,
and with the impact of similar practices abroad upon the American
market.2"8 There is ground for believing that Congress associated price
discrimination with monopoly. 269 This history is important in assessing
the compatibility of the positions of Viner and Liebeler with the origi-
nal congressional intent incorporated in the 1921 Act. The legislative
history of the 1974 and 1979 Acts, amending the Antidumping Act, is
also crucial. This data suggests that Congress has been concerned not
only with predatory pricing but also with a broader range of dumping.
Overall, however, the case is reasonably strong that the congressional
focus in the Antidumping Act and the acts amending it has been on
protecting domestic industries from below-cost sales resulting from for-
eign goverment subsidies, broadly conceived.
To the extent that the legislative history provides room for interpret-
ing the Antidumping Act as directed against behavior which distorts
the long-run workings of the international marketplace, there is oppor-
tunity for infusing that act's construction with economic analysis. Re-
cent experience with the Clayton Act indicates that this approach pos-
sesses great potential. By evaluating certain forms of domestic price
competition, economic analysis has prevented section two of the Clay-
ton Act from impeding aggressive price competition and has en-
couraged an interpretation of the Clayton Act that is more compatible
with the original intent of the enacting Congress. A similar approach
towards the Antidumping Act may help those administering the act to
rise above purely protectionist concerns to an approach which is
broadly consistent with overall national policies.
268. See supra text at notes 96-153 (describing the background of the 1921 Act).
269. See supra, text at notes 36-47 (describing the background of the Clayton Act
§ 2).
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VI. THE ANTIDUMPING ACT AND THE ANTITRUST
LAWS
When the antitrust laws deal with price discrimination as a tactic of
commercial rivalry they treat the issue as one of predatory pricing. Ac-
cordingly, courts now construe section two of the Clayton Act more
consistently with Congress' original intent to deter predatory pricing.
The generally accepted standard for determining the predatory or non-
predatory nature of pricing is the Areeda-Turner standard of marginal
cost, or its practical surrogate, average variable cost.270 Courts tend to
presume that prices above marginal or average variable cost are non-
predatory and those below those levels are predatory.21
In applying the Antidumping Act, different standards for distin-
guishing lawful pricing from unlawful pricing are applicable. 2  Since
the 1916 and 1921 Acts, Congress has defined dumping as sales within
the United States at prices below home-market prices.273 The unstated
assumption, however, is that such prices are less than average total
cost.2 7 " The earlier legislation assumed that the higher home-market
prices of the dumping firms provided some form of subsidy to their
lower export prices, a subsidy which would have been unnecessary if
the export prices had covered their average total costs.27 The 1974 Act
provided an alternative definition of "fair value," 276 as no less than av-
erage total cost, so that upon a showing of injury, sales in the United
States at less than average total cost of production are subject to an-
tidumping duties, regardless of the foreign producers' home-market
price. 7 7 The 1974 Act also seems to be premised upon a kind of sub-
270. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text (reviewing the Areeda-Turner
approach).
271. See supra notes 75-92 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of preda-
tory pricing).
272. See supra notes 168-82 and accompanying text (noting the judicial rejection
of Chairman Liebeler's attempt to incorporate an exclusively predatory standard into
the Antidumping Act).
273. See Antidumping Act of 1916, § 72 (establishing the definition of dumping).
274. See supra text at notes 152-54 and 195-205 (outlining the cross-market sub-
sidy rationale apparently underlying the Antidumping Act and its concern with below-
average-cost pricing by foreign sellers). Viner also assumed dumping prices were gener-
ally below average cost. J. VINER supra note 112, at 147; text at notes 221-22.
275. Id.
276. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(b) (1988) (defining the elements used to determine foreign
market value).
277. Id. Home-market sales at less than the cost of production are disregarded for
purposes of determining foreign market value. Id. When below-cost home-market
prices are disregarded, then home-market value must be constructed by calculating
production cost plus imputed general expenses of 10% and profit of eight percent. 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1988). Below cost sales in the United States are then compared
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sidy rationale: because persistent sales below cost in all markets are
unsustainable, firms which engage in such behavior must be the recipi-
ent of a form of subsidy. Presently, there are two definitions of dump-
ing: (1) price discrimination,27 s and (2) sales below cost, with or with-
out price discrimination.27 9
Chairman Liebeler proposed to construe the Antidumping Act to re-
flect only a concern with predatory pricing, believing that her approach
would incorporate the Areeda-Turner marginal cost standard into the
Antidumping Act and bring about a broad coherence in approach be-
tween the antitrust laws and the antidumping laws.280 The courts that
rejected Liebeler's approach stated that they were following a congres-
sional mandate to pursue an "injury to industry" approach rather than
an "injury to competition" approach.28 They thus agreed with Chair-
man Liebeler's contention that in refusing to employ a marginal-cost
standard, they were imposing a purely protectionist construction upon
the Antidumping Act. 282
In rejecting Chairman Leibeler's attempt to move the interpretation
of the Antidumping Act in a more competitive direction, courts may
have overlooked the vulnerability of the Areeda-Turner standard as a
measure of pricing lawfulness. As a measure of predation, the marginal
cost standard has had its critics. The Eleventh Circuit has rejected the
Areeda-Turner standard for predatoriness in favor of according weight
to subjective intent and the amount by which prices fall below average
total cost.28 3 Judge Richard Posner expressed his preference for a long-
run marginal-cost standard. 4 Furthermore, the Supreme Court de-
clined to state its views on a cost-based standard to determine preda-
tion. 86 Even the Ninth Circuit, a leader in incorporating the Areeda-
Turner approach, stated that pricing below or above average variable
cost creates only a rebuttable presumption of predatory pricing or non-
with this constructed home-market price with the result that below-cost sales in the
United States will always be deemed to be dumping sales.
278. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1677b(a)(1) (1988).
279. Id. §§ 1677b(b), (e).
280. See supra notes 168-79 and accompanying text (reiterating Liebeler's ap-
proach to pricing).
281. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text (illustrating judicial disap-
proval of Liebeler's approach).
282. Id.
283. McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1496, 1503 (11th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989) (using a sum of average variable cost
and average fixed cost).
284. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 188-93 (1976).
285. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584
nn.8, 9 (1986) (illustrating the Court's reluctance to establish a standard for
predatoriness).
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predatory pricing. s6 In that circuit, a plaintiff unable to prove pricing
below average variable cost retains the opportunity to prove predatory
intent by more elaborate evidence of market conditions and the defend-
ant's motivation.287 Moreover, even Areeda and Turner now justify
their standard solely on the basis of its short-run welfare effects;2 88 they
do not try to assess long-run welfare effects which they regard as inde-
terminate. 289 It is, however, the long term effects of predatory pricing
which have been the rationale for its condemnation. An adaptation of
the approach which I have identified with Viner (i.e., the imposition of
antidumping duties under a standard broader than a mere condemna-
tion of predatory pricing) does not have to amount to static protection-
ism. The approach is consistent with the view manifested in USX Corp.
v. United States that the Antidumping Act is concerned with more
than purely predatory behavior 290 as well as with the view that the Act
is designed to further competitive goals. Such an approach could draw,
inter alia, upon the 1974 Senate report which inspired Chairman
Liebeler, but would not constitute as radical a stance as that adopted
by Liebeler. 9 l
An approach modeled upon the one outlined here might well employ
the below-average-total-cost focus of the Antidumping Act in a positive
direction. The act's injury definition may be sufficiently flexible to ad-
mit an average cost criterion for determining which injuries to redress,
especially if sales below cost have been an unstated assumption, even
under the traditional definition of dumping. First, administrators of the
act should use average cost to assess which injuries to domestic indus-
286. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668
F.2d 1014, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982) (delineating the
Ninth Circuit's approach to pricing).
287. Id. An appreciation of how aggressive pricing can alter the dynamics of the
marketplace is missing from the prevailing antitrust analysis. When major firms sell at
marginal cost prices for prolonged periods, they discourage their rivals from reinvesting
in the industry. Those rivals gradually leave the industry and the major firms can then
recoup their previously uncovered capital charges. When the major firms are foreign
producers employing only a part of their capacity in the American market, these effects
are exacerbated. Foreign producers can divert production as needed to replace the sales
of exiting rivals more easily than a domestic rival. Furthermore, such producers may be
able to sell in the American market at marginal cost prices indefinitely, because they
are covering their fixed costs from home-market revenues.
288. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 75, § 715a.
289. Id.
290. USX Corp. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 60 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
291. See supra notes 168-79 and accompanying text (discussing Chairman
Liebeler's approach). As outlined in text, this approach would harness the average cost
concept as a means for providing protection for domestic investment against nonpreda-
tory but plausibly "unfair" price discrimination while ensuring that domestic firms
were not protected against competition from more efficient rivals.
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tries result from more efficient foreign rivals. Second, Congress should
consider legislation capping antidumping duties at the exporters' aver-
age costs. Ideally, the Antidumping Act should be administered to en-
courage investment in industries with future competitive potential.
That will be the result when investors are protected against below-cost
pricing by less efficient foreign rivals, and a cap on antidumping duties
at the dumpers' average cost would achieve that goal. This aspect of
my proposal could draw support from the statutory concern with the
retardation of industry growth, because an industry's growth would be
inappropriately retarded by exposure to below-cost pricing from less ef-
ficient producers, but would not be inappropriately retarded by expo-
sure to fully allocated pricing of efficient producers. As pointed out
above, this approach is not based upon Liebeler's judicially-rejected
view that the Antidumping Act is concerned solely with predatory be-
havior; rather it is predicated upon the Congressional intent to ensure
that the so-called playing field is a level one.
Finally, concern over exploitation by foreign sellers of unfair home-
market advantages to undercut fair competition from efficient Ameri-
can producers should be integrated into the administration of the An-
tidumping Act. Thus the encouragement of home-market overcapacity
by a foreign government should raise an inference that the added ca-
pacity is inefficient; otherwise government assistance would have been
unncessary. Foreign rivals should also be presumed less efficient when
they operate behind official or unofficial trade barriers protecting their
domestic markets, for otherwise they would not need those barriers.
Using average total cost as a guidepost, the Antidumping Act could
avoid the trap of encouraging investment in industries which cannot
withstand competition from equally efficient rivals. This approach
would incorporate the early twentieth century focus on the "unfair-
ness" of dumping as an attribute of monopolistic behavior. A limitation
on protection to below-average-total cost pricing would incorporate the
statutory criteria as well as demonstrate a competitive-market based
concern that no firm should be protected against competition from an
equally efficient rival. Finally, the protection against dumping should
be guided by the ultimate procompetitive goal of assisting the industry
to achieve the level of efficiency in which it can withstand competition
even from rivals selling below cost.
Such a reinterpretation-and, ideally amendment-of the An-
tidumping Act would achieve more than rhetorical harmony with the
antitrust laws. It would provide a sound conceptual basis for distin-
guishing injuries which impede long-run competitiveness and invest-
ment in American industry from injuries purely traceable to the supe-
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rior efficiency of foreign rivals. This reinterpretation potentially would
help to refocus attention upon the type of industry, the ratio of fixed to
variable cost, economies of scale, the period for investment recovery,
risk, and profit as elements of an injury determination. Reorientation of
the administration of the Antidumping Act would also help redirect
attention to foreign market structures and the protections facilitating
noncompetitive pricing in those markets.
While this reassessment of the Antidumping Act would not bring
about perfect harmony between the Antidumping Act and the antitrust
laws, it would be a major step in that direction. Not all violations of
the Antidumping Act would necessarily constitute violations of the an-
titrust laws. While predatory dumping would violate both the an-
tidumping and the antitrust laws, nonpredatory dumping would remain
only within the scope of the Antidumping Act. The treatment of non-
predatory dumping, however, would be explained and justified in con-
ceptions which were common to both sets of laws. 2 2 Such an approach
has the potential to lend substantial coherence to American economic
policy.
292. See supra note 267 and accompanying text (suggesting a way to employ anti-
trust market definitions in the administration of the Antidumping Act). As the admin-
istration of the antitrust and antidumping laws increasingly employs similar conceptual
tools, the opportunities for incorporating antitrust influences in the administration of
the antidumping law increase. This approach would set the stage for the ITC to employ
analytical tools for measuring injury which are similar to those used in antitrust analy-
sis. It would also set the stage for the Commerce Department to abandon skewed mea-
sures of dumping. N. David Palmeter, The Antidumping Law: A Legal and Adminis-
trative Non-Tariff Barrier 9 (Paper presented to the Conference on Procedures &
Methods in the Commerce Department's Administration of the Trade Remedy Laws,
Brookings Inst., Nov. 27, 1990).
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